Based on an earlier patch by Peter Todd, though the rules here are different
(P2SH scripts should not have a CLEANSTACK check before the P2SH evaluation).
* Raise the debug window when hidden behind other windows
* Switch to the debug window when on another virtual desktop
* Show the debug window when minimized
This change is a conceptual copy of 5ffaaba and 382e9e2
GetTransaction needs to lock cs_main until ReadBlockFromDisk completes, the data inside CBlockIndex's can change since pruning. This lock was held by all calls to GetTransaction except rest_tx.
Four cases included:
* The CLTV operand type mismatches the tx locktime. In the script it is
1 (interpreted as block height), but in the tx is 500000000
(interpreted as date)
* The stack is empty when executing OP_CLTV
* The tx is final by having only one input with MAX_INT sequence number
* The operand for CLTV is negative (after OP_0 OP_1 OP_SUB)
Rebased-From: cb54d17355864fa08826d6511a0d7692b21ef2c9
Based on the earlier BIP66 soft-fork logic implemented by Pieter
Wuille's 5a47811da5158df763aa2fca09ce646ee0c51e7b
Rebased-From: 287f54fc90c29301faede8d4ac2ea24a91441917
Transactions that fail CLTV verification will be rejected from the
mempool, making it easy to test the feature. However blocks containing
"invalid" CLTV-using transactions will still be accepted; this is *not*
the soft-fork required to actually enable CLTV for production use.
Rebased-From: ffd75adce01a78b3461b3ff05bcc2b530a9ce994
<nLockTime> CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY -> <nLockTime>
Fails if tx.nLockTime < nLockTime, allowing the funds in a txout to be
locked until some block height or block time in the future is reached.
Only the logic and unittests are implemented; this commit does not have
any actual soft-fork logic in it.
Thanks to Pieter Wuille for rebase.
Credit goes to Gregory Maxwell for the suggestion of comparing the
argument against the transaction nLockTime rather than the current
time/blockheight directly.
Rebased-From: bc60b2b4b401f0adff5b8b9678903ff8feb5867b
While the existing numeric opcodes are all limited to 4-byte bignum
arguments, new opcodes will need different limits.
Rebased-From: 99088d60d8a7747c6d1a7fd5d8cd388be1b3e138
Nagle appears to be a significant contributor to latency now that the static
sleeps are gone. Most of our messages are relatively large compared to
IP + TCP so I do not expect this to create enormous overhead.
This may also reduce traffic burstyness somewhat.
Conflicts:
src/net.cpp
Rebased-From: a4e28b3d1e5c95eb0c87f144851cd65048c3e0bc
Github-Pull: #6867
This adds SCRIPT_VERIFY_LOW_S to STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS which
will make the node require the canonical 'low-s' encoding for
ECDSA signatures when relaying or mining.
Consensus behavior is unchanged.
The rational is explained in a81cd96805ce6b65cca3a40ebbd3b2eb428abb7b:
Absent this kind of test ECDSA is not a strong signature as given
a valid signature {r, s} both that value and {r, -s mod n} are valid.
These two encodings have different hashes allowing third parties a
vector to change users txids. These attacks are avoided by picking
a particular form as canonical and rejecting the other form(s); in
the of the LOW_S rule, the smaller of the two possible S values is
used.
If widely deployed this change would eliminate the last remaining
known vector for nuisance malleability on boring SIGHASH_ALL
p2pkh transactions. On the down-side it will block most
transactions made by sufficiently out of date software.
Unlike the other avenues to change txids on boring transactions this
one was randomly violated by all deployed bitcoin software prior to
its discovery. So, while other malleability vectors where made
non-standard as soon as they were discovered, this one has remained
permitted. Even BIP62 did not propose applying this rule to
old version transactions, but conforming implementations have become
much more common since BIP62 was initially written.
Bitcoin Core has produced compatible signatures since a28fb70e in
September 2013, but this didn't make it into a release until 0.9
in March 2014; Bitcoinj has done so for a similar span of time.
Bitcoinjs and electrum have been more recently updated.
This does not replace the need for BIP62 or similar, as miners can
still cooperate to break transactions. Nor does it replace the
need for wallet software to handle malleability sanely[1]. This
only eliminates the cheap and irritating DOS attack.
[1] On the Malleability of Bitcoin Transactions
Marcin Andrychowicz, Stefan Dziembowski, Daniel Malinowski, Łukasz Mazurek
http://fc15.ifca.ai/preproceedings/bitcoin/paper_9.pdf
Conflicts:
src/policy/policy.h
Rebased-From: b196b685c9089b74fd4ff3d9a28ea847ab36179b
Github-Pull: #6769
5e6d893 travis: for travis generating an extra build (Cory Fields)
ceba0f8 PARTIAL: typofixes (found by misspell_fixer) (Veres Lajos)
2ede6b7 add support for miniupnpc api version 14 (Pavel Vasin)
0dfcdd4 rpc-tests: re-enable rpc-tests for Windows (Cory Fields)
c9ad65e net: Set SO_REUSEADDR for Windows too (Cory Fields)
0194bdd add unit test for CNetAddr::GetGroup. (Alex Morcos)
bdf2542 Fix masking of irrelevant bits in address groups. (Alex Morcos)
65426ac Add missing files to files.md (fanquake)
28d76d2 Handle leveldb::DestroyDB() errors on wipe failure (Adam Weiss)
843469e Use unique name for AlertNotify tempfile (Casey Rodarmor)
4e5ea71 Make sure LogPrint strings are line-terminated (J Ross Nicoll)
3861f0f build: fix libressl detection (Cory Fields)
04507de Avoid leaking file descriptors in RegisterLoad (Casey Rodarmor)
8b59079 Add autogen.sh to source tarball. (randy-waterhouse)
The thin space QT html hack results in cut-off chars/nums after a line break.
Avoid word wrap line breaks by using a smaller font and a line break before each alternative value)
Rebased-From: 24cb7c7bbba224dcb73fcf69296f5ef4734f745f
Github-Pull: #6694
