Tidy a few debug log strings to avoid double spaces, concatenated status words, and mismatched format specifiers.
Co-authored-by: naiyoma <lankas.aurelia@gmail.com>
fa43897c1d14549e7af0d9f912e765875b634c39 doc: Fix LLM nits in net_processing.cpp (MarcoFalke)
bbbba0fd4b87a5441c90d513d2022f4c4d9678cb scripted-diff: Use references when nullptr is not possible (MarcoFalke)
fac54154660438db6a601584fa91f87bc09395b2 refactor: Separate peer/maybe_peer in ProcessMessages and SendMessages (MarcoFalke)
fac529188e0db44875f8728c9e0b6a05d2145e75 refactor: Pass Peer& to ProcessMessage (MarcoFalke)
fa376095a01c421523ec5d012c6aafb006011788 refactor: Pass CNode& to ProcessMessages and SendMessages (MarcoFalke)
fada8380148c1266f2cc1ddb0f65f42651c82a62 refactor: Make ProcessMessage private again (MarcoFalke)
fa80cd3ceed4eb58732c2f6f748277772a8a1c36 test: [refactor] Avoid calling private ProcessMessage() function (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
There is a single unit test, which calls the internal `ProcessMessage` function. This is problematic, because it makes future changes harder, since they will need to carry over this public internal interface each time.
Also, there is a mixed use of pointers and references in p2p code, where just based on context, a pointer may sometimes assumed to be null, or non-null. This is confusing when reading the code, or making or reading future changes.
Fix both issues in a series of commits, to:
* refactor the single unit test to call higher-level functions
* Make `ProcessMessage` private again
* Use references instead of implicit non-null pointers, mostly in a scripted-diff
ACKs for top commit:
optout21:
reACK fa43897c1d14549e7af0d9f912e765875b634c39
ajtowns:
ACK fa43897c1d14549e7af0d9f912e765875b634c39
Crypt-iQ:
crACK fa43897c1d14549e7af0d9f912e765875b634c39
achow101:
ACK fa43897c1d14549e7af0d9f912e765875b634c39
Tree-SHA512: d03d8ea35490a995f121be3d2f3e4a22d1aadfeab30bc42c4f8383dab0e6e27046260e792d9e5a94faa6777490ba036e39c71c50611a38f70b90e3a01f002c9e
7d9e1a810239a65a153c35f0f94490560441db49 test: Verify peer usage after assumeutxo validation completes (stringintech)
0067abe153298ce9f14262a15533033e6e907f2b p2p: Allow block downloads from peers without snapshot block after assumeutxo validation (stringintech)
Pull request description:
Currently, after assumeutxo background validation finishes, the node continues to skip peers that don't have the snapshot block in their best chain until restart. This unnecessarily excludes peers from block downloads even though the background sync has completed and undo data is available.
The restriction persists because `m_chainman.CurrentChainstate().SnapshotBase()` continues to return the snapshot base block until restart, even after validation completes. Added `m_chainman.CurrentChainstate().m_assumeutxo == Assumeutxo::UNVALIDATED` check to only apply the peer restriction while background validation is ongoing.
Also added test coverage in `feature_assumeutxo.py` that verifies peers without the snapshot block can be used for block downloads after background validation completes. The test fails without this fix.
ACKs for top commit:
fjahr:
Re-ACK 7d9e1a810239a65a153c35f0f94490560441db49
achow101:
ACK 7d9e1a810239a65a153c35f0f94490560441db49
sedited:
Re-ACK 7d9e1a810239a65a153c35f0f94490560441db49
Tree-SHA512: 5515971da7bf7efc55eecdf03686f44c20c9e52dd168e7cfa119032d6a8ebccee69df7143075e4e9d0a01426cd9ae7202dce5c00919a82478ebf49a15dc0fe19
This allows to skip nullptr checks later in the code, both mentally and literally.
This can be reviewed via the git option:
--word-diff-regex=.
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed --regexp-extended --in-place '
/^bool PeerManagerImpl::SendMessages\(/,/^}$/ {
s/auto& peer\{maybe_peer\}; .. alias cleaned up .*/Peer\& peer{*maybe_peer};/;
s/peer->/peer./g;
s/\*peer\>/peer/g;
/CNode\* pto\{&node\}; .. alias removed .*/d;
s/pto->/node./g;
s/\*pto\>/node/g;
}
' src/net_processing.cpp
sed --regexp-extended --in-place '
/^void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage\(/,/^}$/ {
/Peer\* peer\{&peer_alias_removed_in_later_commit};/d;
s/peer_alias_removed_in_later_commit/peer/;
s/peer->/peer./g;
s/\*peer\>/peer/g;
}
' src/net_processing.cpp
sed --regexp-extended --in-place '
/^bool PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessages\(/,/^}$/ {
s/auto& peer\{maybe_peer\}; .. alias cleaned up .*/Peer\& peer{*maybe_peer};/;
s/peer->/peer./g;
s/\*peer\>/peer/g;
/CNode\* pfrom\{&node\}; .. alias removed .*/d;
s/pfrom->/node./g;
s/\*pfrom\>/node/g;
}
' src/net_processing.cpp
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
b39291f4cde03d5aa7936bf5aa7cc4fa18f65cad doc: fix `-logips` description to clarify that non-debug logs can also contain IP addresses (Lőrinc)
c7028d3368e90fef2dd2a7ae68877767d602eff0 init: log that additional logs may contain privacy-sensitive information (Lőrinc)
31b771a9425dace38582e0de0fb468f388df170c net: move `privatebroadcast` logs to debug category (Lőrinc)
Pull request description:
### Motivation
The recently merged [private broadcast](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415) is a privacy feature, and users may share `debug.log` with support.
Unconditional `LogInfo()` messages that mention private broadcast and/or include (w)txids can leak sensitive context (e.g. which transactions a user originated).
Since it's meant to be a private broadcast, we should minimize leaks.
It's a best effort, it's not invalidated by other logs possibly leaking identifiable information, those can be addressed separately.
We're not promising that the logs won't ever contain data that could be used against the user, but we should still try to minimize that data, especially for a feature that's advertised as privacy-focused.
Follow up to [#29415 (comment)](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#discussion_r2637012294)
### Changes
* Move private-broadcast event logs from `LogInfo()` to `LogDebug(BCLog::PRIVBROADCAST, ...)`, so they are only emitted when `-debug=privatebroadcast` was explicitly provided.
* Remove hardcoded `"[privatebroadcast]"` log-string prefixes (category logging already adds the prefix).
* Keep warning at the default log level for startup failures.
* Add an init log (not a warning since that would require excessive test framework updates) when any `-debug` categories are enabled that additional logs may contain privacy-sensitive information and should not be shared publicly.
* Update a related startup arg (`-logips`) to clarify that clarify that non-debug logs can also contain IP addresses.
### Reproducer
The new warning can be checked with:
```bash
./build/bin/bitcoind -printtoconsole=1 -stopatheight=1 -listen=0 -connect=0 | grep 'Debug logging is enabled' | wc -l
0
./build/bin/bitcoind -printtoconsole=1 -stopatheight=1 -listen=0 -connect=0 -debug | grep 'Debug logging is enabled' | wc -l
1
```
ACKs for top commit:
janb84:
re ACK b39291f4cde03d5aa7936bf5aa7cc4fa18f65cad
vasild:
ACK b39291f4cde03d5aa7936bf5aa7cc4fa18f65cad
andrewtoth:
ACK b39291f4cde03d5aa7936bf5aa7cc4fa18f65cad
frankomosh:
crACK b39291f4cde03d5aa7936bf5aa7cc4fa18f65cad .The approach and implementation look good. Moving private broadcast logs to debug only would effectively reduce privacy leaks for users sharing logs.
sedited:
ACK b39291f4cde03d5aa7936bf5aa7cc4fa18f65cad
Tree-SHA512: feca25ebe72a03948ba436e25f9a682947966c4c09627e8f20201ef3872ddbce1c636cd82f06be1afdc09cb80da305058667c0c2eaeadeb351311155325ea06f
6a8dbf9b9352db48580cd81c8dac027f3138fedf p2p: add validation check for initial self-announcement (frankomosh)
Pull request description:
This is a follow up to #34146 . Adds validation check to the initial self-announcement code path. `IsAddrCompatible()` check can prevent sending non-routable addresses to peers that don't support addrv2.
ACKs for top commit:
fjahr:
utACK 6a8dbf9b9352db48580cd81c8dac027f3138fedf
Crypt-iQ:
crACK 6a8dbf9b9352db48580cd81c8dac027f3138fedf
stratospher:
ACK 6a8dbf9. preserves the existing behaviour. also learnt that Addr-fetch ADDR processing logic allows receiving a self-announcement with 1 address [without disconnecting](b6c5d1e450) and won't be affected.
sedited:
ACK 6a8dbf9b9352db48580cd81c8dac027f3138fedf
Tree-SHA512: 988110d72fd698634111eb68c0204f42457b9b9b3d7b6ca3e11815cc702f6921266ae8f27f27aa31c3672efdb99478870fc4d1e8f5fa63aceae6f81521b31d8b
`PeerManagerImpl::SendBlockTransactions()` computed the total byte size of requested transactions for a debug log line by calling `ComputeTotalSize()` in a tight loop, triggering serialization even when debug logging is off.
Guard the size accumulation with `LogAcceptCategory` so the serialization work only happens when the log line can be emitted.
No behavior change when debug logging is enabled: the reported block hash, transaction count, and byte totals are the same.
The bounds checks still run unconditionally; the debug-only loop iterates the already-validated response contents.
Separating debug-only work from the critical path reduces risk and favors the performance-critical non-debug case.
This also narrows the racy scope of when logging is toggled from another thread.
Transaction hashes are cached, it may not be intuitive that their sizes are actually recalculated every time.
This is done before the other refactors to clarify why we want to avoid calling this method;
Co-authored-by: maflcko <6399679+maflcko@users.noreply.github.com>
fa64d8424b8de49e219bffb842a33d484fb03212 refactor: Enforce readability-avoid-const-params-in-decls (MarcoFalke)
faf0c2d942c8de7868a3fd3afc7fc9ea700c91d4 refactor: Avoid copies by using const references or by move-construction (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Top level `const` in declarations is problematic for many reasons:
* It is often a typo, where one wanted to denote a const reference. For example `bool PSBTInputSignedAndVerified(const PartiallySignedTransaction psbt, ...` is missing the `&`. This will create a redundant copy of the value.
* In constructors it prevents move construction.
* It can incorrectly imply some data is const, like in an imaginary example `std::span<int> Shuffle(const std::span<int>);`, where the `int`s are *not* const.
* The compiler ignores the `const` from the declaration in the implementation.
* It isn't used consistently anyway, not even on the same line.
Fix some issues by:
* Using a const reference to avoid a copy, where read-only of the value is intended. This is only done for values that may be expensive to copy.
* Using move-construction to avoid a copy
* Applying `readability-avoid-const-params-in-decls` via clang-tidy
ACKs for top commit:
l0rinc:
diff reACK fa64d8424b8de49e219bffb842a33d484fb03212
hebasto:
ACK fa64d8424b8de49e219bffb842a33d484fb03212, I have reviewed the code and it looks OK.
sedited:
ACK fa64d8424b8de49e219bffb842a33d484fb03212
Tree-SHA512: 293c000b4ebf8fdcc75259eb0283a2e4e7892c73facfb5c3182464d6cb6a868b7f4a6682d664426bf2edecd665cf839d790bef0bae43a8c3bf1ddfdd3d068d38
792e2edf57ab31ae5c6f98acf33af8f67506630f p2p: first addr self-announcement in separate msg (0xb10c)
Pull request description:
This makes sure the initial address self-announcement a node sends to a peer happends in a separate P2P message. This has benefits for both inbound and outbound connections:
For inbound connections from a peer to us, previously, we might send the self-announcement along with our response to a GETADDR request. However, the self-announcement might replace an address from the GETADDR response. This isn't clean.
For outbound connections from us to a peer, previously, it could have happend that we send the self-announcement along with other addresses. Since shortly after connection open, the peer might only have one rate-limiting token for us, and the addresses are shuffeld on arrival, it's possible that the self-announcement gets rate-limited. However, note that these rate-limitings seem to be rare in practice.
This is inspired by and based on https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33699#issuecomment-3462287763. The discussion there should be helpful for reviewers.
ACKs for top commit:
bensig:
ACK 792e2edf57ab31ae5c6f98acf33af8f67506630f
achow101:
ACK 792e2edf57ab31ae5c6f98acf33af8f67506630f
fjahr:
Code review ACK 792e2edf57ab31ae5c6f98acf33af8f67506630f
frankomosh:
Code Review ACK [792e2ed](792e2edf57)
Tree-SHA512: e3d39b1e3ae6208b54df4b36c624a32d70a442e01681f49e0c8a65076a818b5bf203c2e51011dc32edbbe3637b3c0b5f18de26e3461c288aa3806646a209a260
de4242f47476769d0a7f3e79e8297ed2dd60d9a4 refactor: Use reference for chain_start in HeadersSyncState (Daniela Brozzoni)
e37555e5401f9fca39ada0bd153e46b2c7ebd095 refactor: Use initializer list in CompressedHeader (Daniela Brozzoni)
0488bdfefe92b2c9a924be9244c91fe472462aab refactor: Remove unused parameter in ReportHeadersPresync (Daniela Brozzoni)
256246a9fa5b05141c93aeeb359394b9c7a80e49 refactor: Remove redundant parameter from CheckHeadersPoW (Daniela Brozzoni)
ca0243e3a6d77d2b218749f1ba113b81444e3f4a refactor: Remove useless CBlock::GetBlockHeader (Pieter Wuille)
45686522224598bed9923e60daad109094d7bc29 refactor: Use std::span in HasValidProofOfWork (Daniela Brozzoni)
4066bfe561a45f61a3c9bf24bec7f600ddcc7467 refactor: Compute work from headers without CBlockIndex (Daniela Brozzoni)
0bf6139e194f355d121bb2aea74715d1c4099598 p2p: Avoid an IsAncestorOfBestHeaderOrTip call (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
This is a partial* revival of #25968
It contains a list of most-unrelated simplifications and optimizations to the code merged in #25717:
- Avoid an IsAncestorOfBestHeaderOrTip call: Just don't call this function when it won't have any effect.
- Compute work from headers without CBlockIndex: Avoid the need to construct a CBlockIndex object just to compute work for a header, when its nBits value suffices for that. Also use some Spans where possible.
- Remove useless CBlock::GetBlockHeader: There is no need for a function to convert a CBlock to a CBlockHeader, as it's a child class of it.
It also contains the following code cleanups, which were suggested by reviewers in #25968:
- Remove redundant parameter from CheckHeadersPoW: No need to pass consensusParams, as CheckHeadersPow already has access to m_chainparams.GetConsensus()
- Remove unused parameter in ReportHeadersPresync
- Use initializer list in CompressedHeader, also make GetFullHeader const
- Use reference for chain_start in HeadersSyncState: chain_start can never be null, so it's better to pass it as a reference rather than a raw pointer
*I decided to leave out three commits that were in #25968 (4e7ac7b94d04e056e9994ed1c8273c52b7b23931, ab52fb4e95aa2732d1a1391331ea01362e035984, 7f1cf440ca1a9c86085716745ca64d3ac26957c0), since they're a bit more involved, and I'm a new contributor. If this PR gets merged, I'll comment under #25968 to note that these three commits are still up for grabs :)
ACKs for top commit:
l0rinc:
ACK de4242f47476769d0a7f3e79e8297ed2dd60d9a4
polespinasa:
re-ACK de4242f47476769d0a7f3e79e8297ed2dd60d9a4
sipa:
ACK de4242f47476769d0a7f3e79e8297ed2dd60d9a4
achow101:
ACK de4242f47476769d0a7f3e79e8297ed2dd60d9a4
hodlinator:
re-ACK de4242f47476769d0a7f3e79e8297ed2dd60d9a4
Tree-SHA512: 1de4f3ce0854a196712505f2b52ccb985856f5133769552bf37375225ea8664a3a7a6a9578c4fd461e935cd94a7cbbb08f15751a1da7651f8962c866146d9d4b
Private broadcast is a privacy feature, and users may share `debug.log` with support.
Unconditional log messages that mention private broadcast and/or include (w)txids can leak which transactions a user originated.
Move private broadcast event logging from `LogInfo()` to `LogDebug(BCLog::PRIVBROADCAST, ...)` so it is only emitted when debug logging is enabled, and drop the hardcoded "[privatebroadcast]" prefixes.
Keep warnings at the default log level without (w)txids, detailed context remains available under `-debug=privatebroadcast`.
Co-authored-by: Vasil Dimov <vd@FreeBSD.org>
89372213048adf37a47427112a1ff836ee84c50e doc: add release notes for 29415 (Vasil Dimov)
582016fa5f013817db650bbba0a40d9195c18e2e test: add unit test for the private broadcast storage (Vasil Dimov)
e74d54e04896a86cad4e4b1bd9641afcc3a026c2 test: add functional test for private broadcast (Vasil Dimov)
818b780a05db126dcfe7efe12c46c84b5cfc3de6 rpc: use private broadcast from sendrawtransaction RPC if -privatebroadcast is ON (Vasil Dimov)
eab595f9cf13f7cb1d25a0db51409535cfe053b1 net_processing: retry private broadcast (Vasil Dimov)
37b79f9c39db5a4a61d360a6a29c8853bb5c7ac0 net_processing: stop private broadcast of a transaction after round-trip (Vasil Dimov)
2de53eee742da11b0e3f6fc44c39f2b5b5929da1 net_processing: handle ConnectionType::PRIVATE_BROADCAST connections (Vasil Dimov)
30a9853ad35365af8545e8e766d75cf398968480 net_processing: move a debug check in VERACK processing earlier (Vasil Dimov)
d1092e5d48ce67bd517068550c78bfcab062a554 net_processing: modernize PushNodeVersion() (Vasil Dimov)
9937a12a2fd5a0033f37f4dda5d75bfc5f15c3b6 net_processing: move the debug log about receiving VERSION earlier (Vasil Dimov)
a098f37b9e240291077a7f440e9f57e61f30e158 net_processing: reorder the code that handles the VERSION message (Vasil Dimov)
679ce3a0b8df6e8cab07965301382d2036ef2368 net_processing: store transactions for private broadcast in PeerManager (Vasil Dimov)
a3faa6f944a672faccac5dd201c8d33a638d9091 node: extend node::TxBroadcast with a 3rd option (Vasil Dimov)
95c051e21051bd469fda659fe7c495d5e264d221 net_processing: rename RelayTransaction() to better describe what it does (Vasil Dimov)
bb49d26032c57714c62a4b31ff1fdd969751683f net: implement opening PRIVATE_BROADCAST connections (Vasil Dimov)
01dad4efe2b38b7a71c96b6222147f395e0c11d9 net: introduce a new connection type for private broadcast (Vasil Dimov)
94aaa5d31b6ff1d0122319fc70e70a7e27e1a0ba init: introduce a new option to enable/disable private broadcast (Vasil Dimov)
d6ee490e0a9a81b69a4751087918303163ba8869 log: introduce a new category for private broadcast (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
_Parts of this PR are isolated in independent smaller PRs to ease review:_
* [x] _https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29420_
* [x] _https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33454_
* [x] _https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33567_
* [x] _https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33793_
---
To improve privacy, broadcast locally submitted transactions (from the `sendrawtransaction` RPC) to the P2P network only via Tor or I2P short-lived connections, or to IPv4/IPv6 peers but through the Tor network.
* Introduce a new connection type for private broadcast of transactions with the following properties:
* started whenever there are local transactions to be sent
* opened to Tor or I2P peers or IPv4/IPv6 via the Tor proxy
* opened regardless of max connections limits
* after handshake is completed one local transaction is pushed to the peer, `PING` is sent and after receiving `PONG` the connection is closed
* ignore all incoming messages after handshake is completed (except `PONG`)
* Broadcast transactions submitted via `sendrawtransaction` using this new mechanism, to a few peers. Keep doing this until we receive back this transaction from one of our ordinary peers (this takes about 1 second on mainnet).
* The transaction is stored in peerman and does not enter the mempool.
* Once we get an `INV` from one of our ordinary peers, then the normal flow executes: we request the transaction with `GETDATA`, receive it with a `TX` message, put it in our mempool and broadcast it to all our existent connections (as if we see it for the first time).
* After we receive the full transaction as a `TX` message, in reply to our `GETDATA` request, only then consider the transaction has propagated through the network and remove it from the storage in peerman, ending the private broadcast attempts.
The messages exchange should look like this:
```
tx-sender >--- connect -------> tx-recipient
tx-sender >--- VERSION -------> tx-recipient (dummy VERSION with no revealing data)
tx-sender <--- VERSION -------< tx-recipient
tx-sender <--- WTXIDRELAY ----< tx-recipient (maybe)
tx-sender <--- SENDADDRV2 ----< tx-recipient (maybe)
tx-sender <--- SENDTXRCNCL ---< tx-recipient (maybe)
tx-sender <--- VERACK --------< tx-recipient
tx-sender >--- VERACK --------> tx-recipient
tx-sender >--- INV/TX --------> tx-recipient
tx-sender <--- GETDATA/TX ----< tx-recipient
tx-sender >--- TX ------------> tx-recipient
tx-sender >--- PING ----------> tx-recipient
tx-sender <--- PONG ----------< tx-recipient
tx-sender disconnects
```
Whenever a new transaction is received from `sendrawtransaction` RPC, the node will send it to a few (`NUM_PRIVATE_BROADCAST_PER_TX`) recipients right away. If after some time we still have not heard anything about the transaction from the network, then it will be sent to 1 more peer (see `PeerManagerImpl::ReattemptPrivateBroadcast()`).
A few considerations:
* The short-lived private broadcast connections are very cheap and fast wrt network traffic. It is expected that some of those peers could blackhole the transaction. Just one honest/proper peer is enough for successful propagation.
* The peers that receive the transaction could deduce that this is initial transaction broadcast from the transaction originator. This is ok, they can't identify the sender.
---
<details>
<summary>How to test this?</summary>
Thank you, @stratospher and @andrewtoth!
Start `bitcoind` with `-privatebroadcast=1 -debug=privatebroadcast`.
Create a wallet and get a new address, go to the Signet faucet and request some coins to that address:
```bash
build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" createwallet test
build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" getnewaddress
```
Get a new address for the test transaction recipient:
```bash
build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" loadwallet test
new_address=$(build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" getnewaddress)
```
Create the transaction:
```bash
# Option 1: `createrawtransaction` and `signrawtransactionwithwallet`:
txid=$(build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" listunspent | jq -r '.[0] | .txid')
vout=$(build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" listunspent | jq -r '.[0] | .vout')
echo "txid: $txid"
echo "vout: $vout"
tx=$(build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" createrawtransaction "[{\"txid\": \"$txid\", \"vout\": $vout}]" "[{\"$new_address\": 0.00001000}]" 0 false)
echo "tx: $tx"
signed_tx=$(build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" signrawtransactionwithwallet "$tx" | jq -r '.hex')
echo "signed_tx: $signed_tx"
# OR Option 2: `walletcreatefundedpsbt` and `walletprocesspsbt`:
# This makes it not have to worry about inputs and also automatically sends back change to the wallet.
# Start `bitcoind` with `-fallbackfee=0.00003000` for instance for 3 sat/vbyte fee.
psbt=$(build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" walletcreatefundedpsbt "[]" "[{\"$new_address\": 0.00001000}]" | jq -r '.psbt')
echo "psbt: $psbt"
signed_tx=$(build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" walletprocesspsbt "$psbt" | jq -r '.hex')
echo "signed_tx: $signed_tx"
```
Finally, send the transaction:
```bash
raw_tx=$(build/bin/bitcoin-cli -chain="signet" sendrawtransaction "$signed_tx")
echo "raw_tx: $raw_tx"
```
</details>
---
<details>
<summary>High-level explanation of the commits</summary>
* New logging category and config option to enable private broadcast
* `log: introduce a new category for private broadcast`
* `init: introduce a new option to enable/disable private broadcast`
* Implement the private broadcast connection handling on the `CConnman` side:
* `net: introduce a new connection type for private broadcast`
* `net: implement opening PRIVATE_BROADCAST connections`
* Prepare `BroadcastTransaction()` for private broadcast requests:
* `net_processing: rename RelayTransaction to better describe what it does`
* `node: extend node::TxBroadcast with a 3rd option`
* `net_processing: store transactions for private broadcast in PeerManager`
* Implement the private broadcast connection handling on the `PeerManager` side:
* `net_processing: reorder the code that handles the VERSION message`
* `net_processing: move the debug log about receiving VERSION earlier`
* `net_processing: modernize PushNodeVersion()`
* `net_processing: move a debug check in VERACK processing earlier`
* `net_processing: handle ConnectionType::PRIVATE_BROADCAST connections`
* `net_processing: stop private broadcast of a transaction after round-trip`
* `net_processing: retry private broadcast`
* Engage the new functionality from `sendrawtransaction`:
* `rpc: use private broadcast from sendrawtransaction RPC if -privatebroadcast is ON`
* New tests:
* `test: add functional test for private broadcast`
* `test: add unit test for the private broadcast storage`
</details>
---
**This PR would resolve the following issues:**
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/3828 Clients leak IPs if they are recipients of a transaction
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/14692 Can't configure bitocoind to only send tx via Tor but receive clearnet transactions
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/19042 Tor-only transaction broadcast onlynet=onion alternative
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/24557 Option for receive events with all networks, but send transactions and/or blocks only with anonymous network[s]?
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/25450 Ability to broadcast wallet transactions only via dedicated oneshot Tor connections
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/32235 Tor: TX circuit isolation
**Issues that are related, but (maybe?) not to be resolved by this PR:**
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/21876 Broadcast a transaction to specific nodes
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/28636 new RPC: sendrawtransactiontopeer
---
Further extensions:
* Have the wallet do the private broadcast as well, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/11887 would have to be resolved.
* Have the `submitpackage` RPC do the private broadcast as well, [draft diff in the comment below](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#pullrequestreview-2972293733), thanks ismaelsadeeq!
* Add some stats via RPC, so that the user can better monitor what is going on during and after the broadcast. Currently this can be done via the debug log, but that is not convenient.
* Make the private broadcast storage, currently in peerman, persistent over node restarts.
* Add (optional) random delay before starting to broadcast the transaction in order to avoid correlating unrelated transactions based on the time when they were broadcast. Suggested independently of this PR [here](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/30471).
* Consider periodically sending transactions that did not originate from the node as decoy, discussed [here](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#discussion_r2035414972).
* Consider waiting for peer's FEEFILTER message and if the transaction that was sent to the peer is below that threshold, then assume the peer is going to drop it. Then use this knowledge to retry more aggressively with another peer, instead of the current 10 min. See [comment below](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#issuecomment-3258611648).
* It may make sense to be able to override the default policy -- eg so submitrawtransaction can go straight to the mempool and relay, even if txs are normally privately relayed. See [comment below](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#issuecomment-3427086681).
* As a side effect we have a new metric available - the time it takes for a transaction to reach a random node in the network (from the point of view of the private broadcast recipient the tx originator is a random node somewhere in the network). This can be useful for monitoring, unrelated to privacy characteristics of this feature.
---
_A previous incarnation of this can be found at https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27509. It puts the transaction in the mempool and (tries to) hide it from the outside observers. This turned out to be too error prone or maybe even impossible._
ACKs for top commit:
l0rinc:
code review diff ACK 89372213048adf37a47427112a1ff836ee84c50e
andrewtoth:
ACK 89372213048adf37a47427112a1ff836ee84c50e
pinheadmz:
ACK 89372213048adf37a47427112a1ff836ee84c50e
w0xlt:
ACK 8937221304 with nit https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29415#discussion_r2654849875
mzumsande:
re-ACK 89372213048adf37a47427112a1ff836ee84c50e
Tree-SHA512: d51dadc865c2eb080c903cbe2f669e69a967e5f9fc64e9a20a68f39a67bf0db6ac2ad682af7fa24ef9f0942a41c89959341a16ba7b616475e1c5ab8e563b9b96
5b7bf47f9b92f5d4483a69d0682797e8cf483434 doc: p2p: replace last remaining "command" terminology with "message type" (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
This small PR is (presumably) the final one in a long series of replacing the confusing "command" terminology with "message type" when referring to the header field of P2P messages, see #18533, #18937, #24078, #24141 and #31163.
The instances were found manually via `$ git grep -i command`, hope I didn't miss any.
ACKs for top commit:
l0rinc:
ACK 5b7bf47f9b92f5d4483a69d0682797e8cf483434
billymcbip:
ACK 5b7bf47f9b92f5d4483a69d0682797e8cf483434
maflcko:
lgtm ACK 5b7bf47f9b92f5d4483a69d0682797e8cf483434
Tree-SHA512: b895873b82f904c2ee9a81b4a2fbb365b60c57f04587ded5ddc7907d209520acb6073f5dd1a19cb2ae6aadab3c85a5ac751c8c398ce7c0e29314eea54e61295c
This makes sure the initial address self-announcement a node sends to
a peer happends in a separate P2P message. This has benefits for both
inbound and outbound connections:
For inbound connections from a peer to us, previously, we might send
the self-announcement along with our response to a GETADDR request.
However, the self-announcement might replace an address from the
GETADDR response. This isn't clean.
For outbound connections from us to a peer, previously, it could have
happend that we send the self-announcement along with other addresses.
Since shortly after connection open, the peer might only have one
rate-limiting token for us, and the addresses are shuffeld on arrival,
it's possible that the self-announcement gets rate-limited. However,
note that these rate-limitings seem to be rare in practice.
This is inspired by and based on https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33699#issuecomment-3462287763
Co-Authored-By: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
The reported starting height of a peer in the VERSION message is
untrusted, and it doesn't seem to be useful anymore (after #20624),
so deprecating the corresponding "startingheight" field seems
reasonable. After that, it can be removed, along with the
`m_starting_height` field of the Peer / CNodeStats structs, as it is
sufficient to show the reported height only once at connection in the
debug log.
After assumeutxo background validation completes, allow block downloads from peers that don't have the snapshot block in their best chain.
Previously, these peers were skipped until restart because `m_chainman.CurrentChainstate().SnapshotBase()` continued returning non-null even after validation finished. Add `m_chainman.CurrentChainstate().m_assumeutxo == Assumeutxo::UNVALIDATED` check to only apply the restriction while background validation is ongoing.
d9319b06cf82664d55f255387a348135fd7f91c7 refactor: unify container presence checks - non-trivial counts (Lőrinc)
039307554eb311ce41648d1f9a12b543f480f871 refactor: unify container presence checks - trivial counts (Lőrinc)
8bb9219b6301215f53e43967d17445aaf1b81090 refactor: unify container presence checks - find (Lőrinc)
Pull request description:
### Summary
Instead of counting occurrences in sets and maps, the C++20 `::contains` method expresses the intent unambiguously and can return early on first encounter.
### Context
Applied clang‑tidy's [readability‑container‑contains](https://clang.llvm.org/extra/clang-tidy/checks/readability/container-contains.html) check, though many cases required manual changes since tidy couldn't fix them automatically.
### Changes
The changes made here were:
| From | To |
|------------------------|------------------|
| `m.find(k) == m.end()` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.find(k) != m.end()` | `m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k)` | `m.contains(k)` |
| `!m.count(k)` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) == 0` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) != 1` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) == 1` | `m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) < 1` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) > 0` | `m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) != 0` | `m.contains(k)` |
> Note that `== 1`/`!= 1`/`< 1` only apply to simple [maps](https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/container/map/contains)/[sets](https://en.cppreference.com/w/cpp/container/set/contains) and had to be changed manually.
There are many other cases that could have been changed, but we've reverted most of those to reduce conflict with other open PRs.
-----
<details>
<summary>clang-tidy command on Mac</summary>
```bash
rm -rfd build && \
cmake -B build \
-DCMAKE_C_COMPILER="$(brew --prefix llvm)/bin/clang" \
-DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER="$(brew --prefix llvm)/bin/clang++" \
-DCMAKE_OSX_SYSROOT="$(xcrun --show-sdk-path)" \
-DCMAKE_C_FLAGS="-target arm64-apple-macos11" \
-DCMAKE_CXX_FLAGS="-target arm64-apple-macos11" \
-DCMAKE_EXPORT_COMPILE_COMMANDS=ON -DBUILD_BENCH=ON -DBUILD_FUZZ_BINARY=ON -DBUILD_FOR_FUZZING=ON
"$(brew --prefix llvm)/bin/run-clang-tidy" -quiet -p build -j$(nproc) -checks='-*,readability-container-contains' | grep -v 'clang-tidy'
```
</details>
Note: this is a take 2 of https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33094 with fewer contentious changes.
ACKs for top commit:
optout21:
reACK d9319b06cf82664d55f255387a348135fd7f91c7
sedited:
ACK d9319b06cf82664d55f255387a348135fd7f91c7
janb84:
re ACK d9319b06cf82664d55f255387a348135fd7f91c7
pablomartin4btc:
re-ACK d9319b06cf82664d55f255387a348135fd7f91c7
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK d9319b06cf82664d55f255387a348135fd7f91c7. I manually reviewed the full change, and it seems there are a lot of positive comments about this and no more very significant conflicts, so I will merge it shortly.
Tree-SHA512: e4415221676cfb88413ccc446e5f4369df7a55b6642347277667b973f515c3c8ee5bfa9ee0022479c8de945c89fbc9ff61bd8ba086e70f30298cbc1762610fe1
Remove the transaction from the list of transactions to broadcast after
we receive it from the network.
Only remove the transaction if it is the same as the one we sent: has
the same wtxid (and it follows the same txid). Don't remove transactions
that have the same txid and different wtxid. Such transactions show that
some of the private broadcast recipients malleated the witness and the
transaction made it back to us. The witness could be either:
* invalid, in which case the transaction will not be accepted in
anybody's pool; or
* valid, in which case either the original or the malleated transaction
will make it to nodes' mempools and eventually be mined. Our response
is to keep broadcasting the original. If the malleated transaction
wins then we will eventually stop broadcasting the original when it
gets stale and gets removed from the "to broadcast" storage cause it
is not acceptable in our mempool.
For connections of type `ConnectionType::PRIVATE_BROADCAST`:
* After receiving VERACK, send a transaction from the list of
transactions for private broadcast and disconnect
* Don't process any messages after VERACK (modulo `GETDATA` and `PONG`)
* Don't send any messages other than the minimum required for the
transaction send - `INV`, `TX`, `PING`.
The following commit will interrupt the processing of the `VERACK`
message earlier for private broadcast connections. The `Assume()` would
be nice to have for private broadcast as well, so move it earlier.
This is a non-functional change.
Rename some variables in `PeerManagerImpl::PushNodeVersion()` and
use one log call instead of 2 almost identical. Also, assign
variables after they are declared to make it easy to assign them
different values, conditionally.
This is a non-functional change.
Move the debug log message that we have received a `VERSION` message
earlier, before any `MakeAndPushMessage()`. Thus, if the processing is
interrupted before `MakeAndPushMessage()`s, the log would still be
executed.
Change the order in which code snippets are executed as a result of
receiving the `VERSION` message. Move the snippets that do
`MakeAndPushMessage()` near the end. This makes it easier to interrupt
the execution when no messages should be sent as a response to the
`VERSION` messages, in private broadcast connections.
This is a non-functional change.
Extend `PeerManager` with a transaction storage and a new method
`InitiateTxBroadcastPrivate()` which:
* adds a transaction to that storage and
* calls `CConnman::PrivateBroadcast::NumToOpenAdd()` to open dedicated
privacy connections that will pick an entry from the transaction
storage and broadcast it.
Rename `PeerManager::RelayTransaction()` to
`PeerManager::InitiateTxBroadcastToAll()`. The transaction is not
relayed when the method returns. It is only enqueued for a possible
broadcasting at a later time. Also, there will be another method which
only does so to Tor or I2P peers.
82be652e40ec7e1bea4b260ee804a92a3e05f496 doc: Improve ChainstateManager documentation, use consistent terms (Ryan Ofsky)
af455dcb39dbd53700105e29c87de5db65ecf43c refactor: Simplify pruning functions (TheCharlatan)
ae85c495f1b507ca5871ea98f5d884fccb15adba refactor: Delete ChainstateManager::GetAll() method (Ryan Ofsky)
6a572dbda92ceb8c5af379f51cf6f9b93fb5e486 refactor: Add ChainstateManager::ActivateBestChains() method (Ryan Ofsky)
491d827d5284ed984ee2b11daaee50321217eac5 refactor: Add ChainstateManager::m_chainstates member (Ryan Ofsky)
e514fe61168109bd467d7cb2ac7561442b17b5f6 refactor: Delete ChainstateManager::SnapshotBlockhash() method (Ryan Ofsky)
ee35250683ab9a395b70a0e90ebc68b1858387c7 refactor: Delete ChainstateManager::IsSnapshotValidated() method (Ryan Ofsky)
d9e82299fc4e45fbc0f5a34dcbb1d51397d0bd35 refactor: Delete ChainstateManager::IsSnapshotActive() method (Ryan Ofsky)
4dfe383912761669a968f8535ed43437da160ec8 refactor: Convert ChainstateRole enum to struct (Ryan Ofsky)
352ad27fc1b1b350c8dbeb26a9813b01025cad31 refactor: Add ChainstateManager::ValidatedChainstate() method (Ryan Ofsky)
a229cb9477e6622087241be7a105551d1329503b refactor: Add ChainstateManager::CurrentChainstate() method (Ryan Ofsky)
a9b7f5614c24fe6f386448604c325ec4fa6c98a5 refactor: Add Chainstate::StoragePath() method (Ryan Ofsky)
840bd2ef230ed0582fe33a90ec2636bfefa21709 refactor: Pass chainstate parameters to MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation (Ryan Ofsky)
1598a15aedb9fd9c4e4a671785ebebf56fc1e072 refactor: Deduplicate Chainstate activation code (Ryan Ofsky)
9fe927b6d654e752dac82156e209e45d31b75779 refactor: Add Chainstate m_assumeutxo and m_target_utxohash members (Ryan Ofsky)
6082c84713f42f5fa66f9a76baef17e8ed231633 refactor: Add Chainstate::m_target_blockhash member (Ryan Ofsky)
de00e87548f7ddd623355b7094924b0387a36280 test: Fix broken chainstatemanager_snapshot_init check (Ryan Ofsky)
Pull request description:
This PR contains the first part of #28608, which tries to make assumeutxo code more maintainable, and improve it by not locking `cs_main` for a long time when the snapshot block is connected, and by deleting the snapshot validation chainstate when it is no longer used, instead of waiting until the next restart.
The changes in this PR are just refactoring. They make `Chainstate` objects self-contained, so for example, it is possible to determine what blocks to connect to a chainstate without querying `ChainstateManager`, and to determine whether a Chainstate is validated without basing it on inferences like `&cs != &ActiveChainstate()` or `GetAll().size() == 1`.
The PR also tries to make assumeutxo terminology less confusing, using "current chainstate" to refer to the chainstate targeting the current network tip, and "historical chainstate" to refer to the chainstate downloading old blocks and validating the assumeutxo snapshot. It removes uses of the terms "active chainstate," "usable chainstate," "disabled chainstate," "ibd chainstate," and "snapshot chainstate" which are confusing for various reasons.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
re-review ACK 82be652e40ec7e1bea4b260ee804a92a3e05f496 🕍
fjahr:
re-ACK 82be652e40ec7e1bea4b260ee804a92a3e05f496
sedited:
Re-ACK 82be652e40ec7e1bea4b260ee804a92a3e05f496
Tree-SHA512: 81c67abba9fc5bb170e32b7bf8a1e4f7b5592315b4ef720be916d5f1f5a7088c0c59cfb697744dd385552f58aa31ee36176bae6a6e465723e65861089a1252e5
Change ChainstateRole parameter passed to wallets and indexes. Wallets and
indexes need to know whether chainstate is historical and whether it is fully
validated. They should not be aware of the assumeutxo snapshot validation
process.
CurrentChainstate() is basically the same as ActiveChainstate() except it
requires cs_main to be locked when it is called, instead of locking cs_main
internally.
The name "current" should also be less confusing than "active" because multiple
chainstates can be active, and CurrentChainstate() returns the chainstate
targeting the current network tip, regardless of what chainstates are being
downloaded or how they are used.
Make Chainstate objects aware of what block they are targeting. This makes
Chainstate objects more self contained, so it's possible for validation code to
look at one Chainstate object and know what blocks to connect to it without
needing to consider global validation state or look at other Chainstate
objects.
The motivation for this change is to make validation and networking code more
readable, so understanding it just requires knowing about chains and blocks,
not reasoning about assumeutxo download states. This change also enables
simplifications to the ChainstateManager interface in subsequent commits, and
could make it easier to implement new features like creating new Chainstate
objects to generate UTXO snapshots or index UTXO data.
Note that behavior of the MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation function is not
changing here but some checks that were previously impossible to trigger like
the BASE_BLOCKHASH_MISMATCH case have been turned into asserts.
It will enable different error handling flows for different error types.
Also, `ReadRawBlockBench` performance has decreased due to no longer reusing a vector
with an unchanging capacity - mirroring our production code behavior.
Co-authored-by: Hodlinator <172445034+hodlinator@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lőrinc <pap.lorinc@gmail.com>
d4d184eda9c0f73bc31ece07d5001d887b5c6914 log: don't rate-limit "new peer" with -debug=net (0xb10c)
Pull request description:
Previously, when `debug=net` is enabled, we log "New [..] peer connected" for new inbound peers with `LogInfo`. However, `LogInfo` will get rate-limited since https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32604. When we specifically turn on `debug=net`, we don't want these log messages to be rate-limited.
To fix this, use `LogDebug(BCLog::NET, ...)` for potentially high-rate inbound connections. Otherwise use `LogInfo`. This means we don't rate-limit the messages for inbound peers when `debug=net` is turned on but will rate-limit if we created outbound at a high rate as these are logged via `LogInfo`.
The new log messages look similar to:
```
2025-12-08T00:00:00Z [net] New inbound peer connected: transport=v2 version=70016 blocks=0 peer=1
2025-12-08T00:00:00Z New outbound-full-relay peer connected: transport=v2 version=70016 blocks=281738 peer=5
```
--
I ran into this message getting rate-limited on one of my monitoring nodes with `-logsourcelocations=1`: With logsourcelocations, one of these lines is about 338 chars (or 338 bytes) long. We rate-limit after more than 1048576 bytes per hour, which results in about 3100 in- and outbound connections per hour. With evicted and instantly reconnecting connections from an entity like LinkingLion, this can be reached fairly quickly.
ACKs for top commit:
stickies-v:
utACK d4d184eda9c0f73bc31ece07d5001d887b5c6914
Crypt-iQ:
tACK d4d184eda9c0f73bc31ece07d5001d887b5c6914
maflcko:
review ACK d4d184eda9c0f73bc31ece07d5001d887b5c6914 🚲
rkrux:
lgtm code review ACK d4d184eda9c0f73bc31ece07d5001d887b5c6914
glozow:
lgtm ACK d4d184eda9c0f73bc31ece07d5001d887b5c6914
Tree-SHA512: 14dbf693fa44a74c9822590e7a08167d2deeb1bc6f4b8aeb00c1b035c0df7101087d5c80a3c0d637879d5c52f88b30f0cb4c0577cff6f647d2eb3300f49d8ea3
4b4711369880369729893ba7baef11ba2a36cf4b validation: Reword CheckForkWarningConditions and call it also during IBD and at startup (Martin Zumsande)
2f51951d03cc1f8917e0fc931dce674f9bfedaf5 p2p: Add warning message when receiving headers for blocks cached as invalid (Martin Zumsande)
Pull request description:
In case of corruption that leads to a block being marked as invalid that is seen as valid by the rest of the network, the user currently doesn't receive good error messages, but will often be stuck in an endless headers-sync loop with no explanation (#26391).
This PR improves warnings in two ways:
- When we receive a header that is already saved in our disk, but invalid, add a warning. This will happen repeatedly during the headerssync loop (see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/26391#issuecomment-1291765534 on how to trigger it artificially).
- Removes the IBD check from `CheckForkWarningConditions` and adds a call to the function during init (`LoadChainTip()`). The existing check was added in 55ed3f1475 a long time ago when we had more sophisticated fork detection that could lead to false positives during IBD, but that logic was removed in fa62304c97 so that I don't see a reason to suppress the warning anymore.
Fixes#26391 (We'll still do the endless looping, trying to find a peer with a headers that we can use, but will now repeatedly log warnings while doing so).
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
ACK `git range-diff 6d2c8ea9dbd77c71051935b5ab59224487509559...4b4711369880369729893ba7baef11ba2a36cf4b`
theStack:
re-ACK 4b4711369880369729893ba7baef11ba2a36cf4b
sedited:
ACK 4b4711369880369729893ba7baef11ba2a36cf4b
Tree-SHA512: 78bc53606374636d616ee10fdce0324adcc9bcee2806a7e13c9471e4c02ef00925ce6daef303bc153b7fcf5a8528fb4263c875b71d2e965f7c4332304bc4d922
Previously, when `debug=net` is enabled, we log "New [..] peer connected"
for new inbound peers with `LogInfo`. However, `LogInfo` will get
rate-limited since https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32604.
When we specifically turn on `debug=net`, we don't want these log
messages to be rate-limited.
To fix this, use `LogDebug(BCLog::NET, ...)` for potentially high-
rate inbound connections. Otherwise use `LogInfo`. This means we
don't rate-limit the messages for inbound peers when `debug=net`
is turned on but will rate-limit if we created outbound at a high
rate as these are logged via `LogInfo`.
--
I ran into this message getting rate-limited on one of my monitoring
nodes with `-logsourcelocations=1`: With logsourcelocations, one of
these lines is about 338 chars (or 338 bytes) long. We rate-limit
after more than 1048576 bytes per hour, which results in about
3100 in- and outbound connections per hour. With evicted and
instantly reconnecting connections from an entity like LinkingLion,
this can be reached fairly quickly.
Co-Authored-By: Eugene Siegel <elzeigel@gmail.com>
Co-Authored-By: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
faa23738fc2576e412edb04a4004fab537a3098e refactor: Enable clang-tidy bugprone-unused-return-value (MarcoFalke)
fa114be27b17ed32c1d9a7106f313a0df8755fa2 Add util::Expected (std::expected) (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Some low-level code could benefit from being able to use `std::expected` from C++23:
* Currently, some code is using `std::optional<E>` to denote an optional error. This is fine, but a bit confusing, because `std::optional` is normally used for values, not errors. Using `std::expected<void, E>` is clearer.
* Currently, some code is using `std::variant<V, E>` to denote either a value or an error. This is fine, but a bit verbose, because `std::variant` requires a visitor or get_if/holds_alternative instead of a simple call of the `operator bool` for `std::expected`.
In theory, `util::Result` could be taught to behave similar to `std::expected` (see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/34005). However, it is unclear if this is the right approach:
* `util::Result` is mostly meant for higher level code, where errors come with translated error messages.
* `std::expected` is mostly meant for lower level code, where errors could be an enum, or any other type.
* https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25665 aims to minimize the memory footprint of the error by wrapping it in a unique_ptr internally. `std::expected` requires the value and error to be "nested within it" (https://cplusplus.github.io/LWG/issue4141). So from a memory-layout perspective, the two are not compatible.
* `std::expected` also comes with `std::unexpected`, which also does not map cleanly to `util::Result`.
So just add a minimal drop-in port of `std::expected`.
ACKs for top commit:
romanz:
tACK faa23738fc
sedited:
Re-ACK faa23738fc2576e412edb04a4004fab537a3098e
hodlinator:
ACK faa23738fc2576e412edb04a4004fab537a3098e
rkrux:
light Code Review ACK faa23738fc2576e412edb04a4004fab537a3098e
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK faa23738fc2576e412edb04a4004fab537a3098e, only adding `value_or` implementation and `CheckedReturnTypes` clang-tidy commit since last review.
stickies-v:
ACK faa23738fc2576e412edb04a4004fab537a3098e
Tree-SHA512: fdbd0f6bf439738ffe6a68da5522f1051537f8df9c308eb90bef6bd2e06931d79f1c5da22d5500765e9cb1d801d5be39e11e10d47c9659fec1a8c8804cb7c872
The changes made here were:
| From | To |
|-------------------|------------------|
| `m.count(k)` | `m.contains(k)` |
| `!m.count(k)` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) == 0` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) != 0` | `m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) > 0` | `m.contains(k)` |
The commit contains the trivial, mechanical refactors where it doesn't matter if the container can have multiple elements or not
Co-authored-by: Jan B <608446+janb84@users.noreply.github.com>
Currently, if database corruption leads to a block being marked as
invalid incorrectly, we can get stuck in an infinite headerssync
loop with no indication what went wrong or how to fix it.
With the added log message, users will receive an explicit warning after each
failed headerssync attempt with an outbound peer.
