fa0d9211ef87a682573aaae932c0c440acbcb8a8 refactor: Remove chainparams arg from CChainState member functions (MarcoFalke)
fa389471251f043ec25e7b01e59b37d3b921ce54 refactor: Remove ::Params() global from inside CChainState member functions (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
The `::Params()` global is verbose and confusing. Also it makes tests a bit harder to write because they'd have to mock a global.
Fix all issues by simply using a member variable that points to the right params.
(Can be reviewed with `--word-diff-regex=.`)
ACKs for top commit:
jnewbery:
ACK fa0d9211ef87a682573aaae932c0c440acbcb8a8
kiminuo:
utACK fa0d9211
theStack:
ACK fa0d9211ef87a682573aaae932c0c440acbcb8a8 🍉
Tree-SHA512: 44676b19c9ed471ccb536331d3029bad192d7d50f394fd7b8527ec431452aeec8c4494164b9cf8e16e0123c4463b16be864366c6b599370032c17262625a0356
7ad414f4bfa74595ee5726e66f3527045c02a977 doc: add comment about CCoinsViewDBCursor constructor (James O'Beirne)
0f8a5a4dd530549d37c43da52c923ac3b2af1a03 move-only(ish): don't expose CCoinsViewDBCursor (James O'Beirne)
615c1adfb07b9b466173166dc2e53ace540e4b32 refactor: wrap CCoinsViewCursor in unique_ptr (James O'Beirne)
Pull request description:
I tripped over this one for a few hours at the beginning of the week, so I've sort of got a personal vendetta against `CCoinsView::Cursor()` returning a raw pointer.
Specifically in the case of CCoinsViewDB, if a raw cursor is allocated and not freed, a cryptic leveldb assertion failure occurs on CCoinsViewDB destruction (`Assertion 'dummy_versions_.next_ == &dummy_versions_' failed.`).
This is a pretty simple change.
Related to: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/21766
See also: https://github.com/google/leveldb/issues/142#issuecomment-414418135
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK 7ad414f4bfa74595ee5726e66f3527045c02a977 🔎
jonatack:
re-ACK 7ad414f4bfa74595ee5726e66f3527045c02a977 modulo suggestion
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 7ad414f4bfa74595ee5726e66f3527045c02a977. Two new commits look good and thanks for clarifying constructor comment
Tree-SHA512: 6471d03e2de674d84b1ea0d31e25f433d52aa1aa4996f7b4aab1bd02b6bc340b15e64cc8ea07bbefefa3b5da35384ca5400cc230434e787c30931b8574c672f9
Save the banlist in `banlist.json` instead of `banlist.dat`.
This makes it possible to store Tor v3 entries in the banlist on disk
(and any other addresses that cannot be serialized in addrv1 format).
Only read `banlist.dat` if it exists and `banlist.json` does not
exist (first start after an upgrade).
Supersedes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20904
Resolves https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/19748
458a345b0590fd2fa04c7d8d70beb8d57e34bbc8 Add support for SIGHASH_DEFAULT in RPCs, and make it default (Pieter Wuille)
c0f0c8eccb04f90940007e0c6aaff56bf2ab35b5 tests: check spending of P2TR (Pieter Wuille)
a2380127e905e5849f90acc7c69832859d8336aa Basic Taproot signing logic in script/sign.cpp (Pieter Wuille)
49487bc3b6038393c1b9c2dbdc04a78ae1178f1a Make GetInputUTXO safer: verify non-witness UTXO match (Pieter Wuille)
fd3f6890f3dfd683f6f13db912caf5c4288adf08 Construct and use PrecomputedTransactionData in PSBT signing (Pieter Wuille)
5cb6502ac5730ea453edbec4c46027ac2ada97e0 Construct and use PrecomputedTransactionData in SignTransaction (Pieter Wuille)
5d2e22437b22e7465ae4be64069443bcc1769dc9 Don't nuke witness data when signing fails (Pieter Wuille)
ce9353164bdb6215a62b2b6dcb2121d331796f60 Permit full precomputation in PrecomputedTransactionData (Pieter Wuille)
e841fb503d7a662bde01ec2e4794faa989265950 Add precomputed txdata support to MutableTransactionSignatureCreator (Pieter Wuille)
a91d532338ecb66ec5bed164929d878dd55d63a4 Add CKey::SignSchnorr function for BIP 340/341 signing (Pieter Wuille)
e77a2839b54fa2039bba468e8c09dbbbf19b150a Use HandleMissingData also in CheckSchnorrSignature (Pieter Wuille)
dbb0ce9fbff01ffe4dd29da465f43ecaddc2854c Add TaprootSpendData data structure, equivalent to script map for P2[W]SH (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Builds on top of #22051, adding signing support after derivation support.
Nothing is changed in descriptor features. Signing works for key path and script path spending, through the normal sending functions, and PSBT-based RPCs. However, PSBT usability is rather low as no extensions have been defined to convey Taproot-specific information, so all script information must be known to the signing wallet.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
re-ACK 458a345b0590fd2fa04c7d8d70beb8d57e34bbc8
fjahr:
Code review ACK 458a345b0590fd2fa04c7d8d70beb8d57e34bbc8
Sjors:
ACK 458a345b0590fd2fa04c7d8d70beb8d57e34bbc8
Tree-SHA512: 30ed212cf7754763a4a81624ebc084c51727b8322711ac0b390369213c1a891d367ed8b123882ac08c99595320c11ec57ee42304ff22a69afdc3d1a0d55cc711
9550dffa0c61df6d1591c62d09629b4c5731e1b7 fuzz: Assert roundtrip equality for `CPubKey` (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
This PR is a (quite late) follow-up to #19237 (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19237#issuecomment-642203251). Looking at `CPubKey::Serialize` and `CPubKey::Unserialize` I can't think of a scenario where the roundtrip (serialization/deserialization) equality wouldn't hold.
ACKs for top commit:
jamesob:
crACK 9550dffa0c pending CI
Tree-SHA512: 640fb9e777d249769b22ee52c0b15a68ff0645b16c986e1c0bce9742155d14f1be601e591833e1dc8dcffebf271966c6b861b90888a44aae1feae2e0248e2c55
f8866e8c324be3322fa507c2ceb1de35d148d0f1 Add roundtrip fuzz tests for CAddress serialization (Pieter Wuille)
e2f0548b52a4b2ba3edf77e3f21365f1e8f270a4 Use addrv2 serialization in anchors.dat (Pieter Wuille)
8cd8f37dfe3ffb73a09f3ad773603d9d89452245 Introduce well-defined CAddress disk serialization (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Alternative to #20509.
This makes the `CAddress` disk serialization format well defined, and uses it to enable addrv2 support in anchors.dat (in a way that's compatible with older software). The new format is:
- The first 4 bytes store a format version number. Its low 19 bits are ignored (as those historically stored the `CLIENT_VERSION`), but its high 13 bits specify the actual serialization:
- 0x00000000: LE64 encoding for `nServices`, V1 encoding for `CService` (like pre-BIP155 network serialization).
- 0x20000000: CompactSize encoding for `nServices`, V2 encoding for `CService` (like BIP155 network serialization).
- Any other value triggers an unsupported format error on deserialization, and can be used for future format changes.
- The `ADDRV2_FORMAT` flag in the stream's version does not determine the actual serialization format; it only sets whether or not V2 encoding is permitted.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK f8866e8c324be3322fa507c2ceb1de35d148d0f1
laanwj:
Code review ACK f8866e8c324be3322fa507c2ceb1de35d148d0f1
vasild:
ACK f8866e8c324be3322fa507c2ceb1de35d148d0f1
jonatack:
ACK f8866e8c324be3322fa507c2ceb1de35d148d0f1 tested rebased to master and built/run/restarted with DEBUG_ADDRMAN, peers.dat and anchors ser/deser seems fine
hebasto:
ACK f8866e8c324be3322fa507c2ceb1de35d148d0f1, tested on Linux Mint 20.1 (x86_64).
Tree-SHA512: 3898f8a8c51783a46dd0aae03fa10060521f5dd6e79315fe95ba807689e78f202388ffa28c40bf156c6f7b1fc2ce806b155dcbe56027df73d039a55331723796
faf1af58f85da74f94c6b5f6910c7faf7b47cc88 fuzz: Add Temporary debug assert for oss-fuzz issue (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
oss-fuzz is acting weird, so add an earlier assert to help troubleshooting
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
cr ACK faf1af58f85da74f94c6b5f6910c7faf7b47cc88
Tree-SHA512: 85830d7d47cf6b4edfe91a07bd5aa8f7110db0bade8df93868cf276ed04d5dd17e671f769e6a0fb5092012b86aa82bb411fb171411f15746981104ce634c88c1
The unit test is single threaded, so there's no need to hold the mutex
between Good() and Attempt().
This change avoids recursive locking in the CAddrMan::Attempt function.
Co-authored-by: John Newbery <john@johnnewbery.com>
1b1088d52fbff8b1c9438d6aa8c6edcbdd471457 test: add combined I2P/onion/localhost eviction protection tests (Jon Atack)
7c2284eda22a08dbf2a560894e496e245d026ee0 test: add tests for inbound eviction protection of I2P peers (Jon Atack)
ce02dd1ef1f7f54f33780b32f195d31c1cc87318 p2p: extend inbound eviction protection by network to I2P peers (Jon Atack)
70bbc62711643ec57cce620f9f7a0e1fe5fb6346 test: add combined onion/localhost eviction protection coverage (Jon Atack)
045cb40192bf3dfa6c42916237e55f86bbc788d4 p2p: remove unused m_is_onion member from NodeEvictionCandidate struct (Jon Atack)
310fab49282d507e5fa710afb20d036604bbf3a2 p2p: remove unused CompareLocalHostTimeConnected() (Jon Atack)
9e889e8a5c021b0ec7e4c4d17d418ab4a0accad4 p2p: remove unused CompareOnionTimeConnected() (Jon Atack)
787d46bb2a39fb39166882cc6e0afbc34424d88e p2p: update ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() doxygen docs (Jon Atack)
1e15acf478ae071234350c9b38dc823dfe2e3419 p2p: make ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() fully ratio-based (Jon Atack)
3f8105c4d251e0e81bdd31f0999004e36f8990b2 test: remove combined onion/localhost eviction protection tests (Jon Atack)
38a81a8e20b0e5ad9fef0eae8abd914619f05b25 p2p: add CompareNodeNetworkTime() comparator struct (Jon Atack)
4ee7aec47ebf6b59b4d930e6e4025e91352c05b4 p2p: add m_network to NodeEvictionCandidate struct (Jon Atack)
7321e6f2fe1641eb331f30e68646f5984d4bcbb3 p2p, refactor: rename vEvictionCandidates to eviction_candidates (Jon Atack)
ec590f1d91325404383d74098a5b42a2cd67dad9 p2p, refactor: improve constness in ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio() (Jon Atack)
4a19f501abac4adb476a6f2a30dfdf1a35892ccc test: add ALL_NETWORKS to test utilities (Jon Atack)
519e76bb64d03ecac175ec33c31e37d0e90f037f test: speed up and simplify peer_eviction_test (Jon Atack)
1cde8005233d163723d4d5bf1bacf22e6cb7a07e p2p, refactor: rm redundant erase_size calculation in SelectNodeToEvict() (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
Continuing the work in #20197 and #20685, this pull updates and abstracts our inbound eviction protection to make it fully ratio-based and easily extensible to peers connected via high-latency privacy networks that we newly support, like I2P and perhaps others soon, as these peers are disadvantaged by the latency criteria of our eviction logic.
It then adds eviction protection for peers connected over I2P. As described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20685#issuecomment-767486499, we've observed over the past few months that I2P peers have a min ping latency similar to or greater than that of onion peers.
The algorithm is a basically a multi-pass knapsack:
- Count the number of eviction candidates in each of the disadvantaged
privacy networks.
- Sort the networks from lower to higher candidate counts, so that
a network with fewer candidates will have the first opportunity
for any unused slots remaining from the previous iteration. In
the case of a tie in candidate counts, priority is given by array
member order from first to last, guesstimated to favor more unusual
networks.
- Iterate through the networks in this order. On each iteration,
allocate each network an equal number of protected slots targeting
a total number of candidates to protect, provided any slots remain
in the knapsack.
- Protect the candidates in that network having the longest uptime,
if any in that network are present.
- Continue iterating as long as we have non-allocated slots
remaining and candidates available to protect.
The goal of this logic is to favorise the diversity of our peer connections.
The individual commit messages describe each change in more detail.
Special thank you to Vasil Dimov for the excellent review feedback and the algorithm improvement that made this change much better than it would have been otherwise. Thanks also to Antoine Riard, whose review feedback nudged this change to protect disadvantaged networks having fewer, rather than more, eviction candidates.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review re-ACK 1b1088d52fbff8b1c9438d6aa8c6edcbdd471457
vasild:
ACK 1b1088d52fbff8b1c9438d6aa8c6edcbdd471457
Tree-SHA512: 722f790ff11f2969c79e45a5e0e938d94df78df8687e77002f32e3ef5c72a9ac10ebf8c7a9eb7f71882c97ab0e67b2778191effdb747d9ca54d7c23c2ed19a90
This commit extends our inbound eviction protection to I2P peers to
favorise the diversity of peer connections, as peers connected
through the I2P network are otherwise disadvantaged by our eviction
criteria for their higher latency (higher min ping times) relative
to IPv4 and IPv6 peers, as well as relative to Tor onion peers.
The `networks` array is order-dependent in the case of a tie in
candidate counts between networks (earlier array members receive
priority in the case of a tie).
Therefore, we place I2P candidates before localhost and onion ones
in terms of opportunity to recover unused remaining protected slots
from the previous iteration, guesstimating that most nodes allowing
both onion and I2P inbounds will have more onion peers, followed by
localhost, then I2P, as I2P support is only being added in the
upcoming v22.0 release.
with a more abstract framework to allow easily extending inbound
eviction protection to peers connected through new higher-latency
networks that are disadvantaged by our inbound eviction criteria,
such as I2P and perhaps other BIP155 networks in the future like
CJDNS. This is a change in behavior.
The algorithm is a basically a multi-pass knapsack:
- Count the number of eviction candidates in each of the disadvantaged
privacy networks.
- Sort the networks from lower to higher candidate counts, so that
a network with fewer candidates will have the first opportunity
for any unused slots remaining from the previous iteration. In
the case of a tie in candidate counts, priority is given by array
member order from first to last, guesstimated to favor more unusual
networks.
- Iterate through the networks in this order. On each iteration,
allocate each network an equal number of protected slots targeting
a total number of candidates to protect, provided any slots remain
in the knapsack.
- Protect the candidates in that network having the longest uptime,
if any in that network are present.
- Continue iterating as long as we have non-allocated slots
remaining and candidates available to protect.
Localhost peers are treated as a network like Tor or I2P by aliasing
them to an unused Network enumerator: Network::NET_MAX.
The goal is to favorise diversity of our inbound connections.
Credit to Vasil Dimov for improving the algorithm from single-pass
to multi-pass to better allocate unused protection slots.
Co-authored-by: Vasil Dimov <vd@FreeBSD.org>
as we are about the change the behavior sufficiently that when we
have multiple disadvantaged networks and a small number of peers
under test, the number of protected peers per network can be different.
This speeds up the test significantly, which helps when
running it repeatedly.
Suggest reviewing the diff with:
colorMoved = dimmed-zebra
colorMovedWs = allow-indentation-change
6f994882deafe62e97f0a889d8bdb8c96dcf913d validation: Farewell, global Chainstate! (Carl Dong)
972c5166ee685447a6d4bf5e501b07a0871fba85 qt/test: Reset chainman in ~ChainstateManager instead (Carl Dong)
6c3b5dc0c13c3ac8c6e86298f924abe99d8d6bd1 scripted-diff: tree-wide: Remove all review-only assertions (Carl Dong)
3e82abb8dd7e21ec918966105648be7ae077fd8c tree-wide: Remove stray review-only assertion (Carl Dong)
f323248aba5088c9630e5cdfe5ce980f21633fe8 qt/test: Use existing chainman in ::TestGUI (can be scripted-diff) (Carl Dong)
6c15de129cd645bf0547cb184003fae131b95b83 scripted-diff: wallet/test: Use existing chainman (Carl Dong)
ee0ab1e959e0e75e04d87fabae8334ad4656f3e5 fuzz: Initialize a TestingSetup for test_one_input (Carl Dong)
0d61634c066a7102d539e85e2b1a4ca15be9660a scripted-diff: test: Use existing chainman in unit tests (Carl Dong)
e197076219e986ede6cf924e0ea36bd723503b2d test: Pass in CoinsTip to ValidateCheckInputsForAllFlags (Carl Dong)
4d99b61014ba26eb1f3713df5528d2804edff165 test/miner_tests: Pass in chain tip to CreateBlockIndex (Carl Dong)
f0dd5e6bb4b16e69d35b648b7ef973a732229873 test/util: Use existing chainman in ::PrepareBlock (Carl Dong)
464c313e304cef04a82e14f736e3c44ed5604a4e init: Use existing chainman (Carl Dong)
Pull request description:
Based on: #21767
à la Mr. Sandman
```
Mr. Chainman, bring me a tip (bung, bung, bung, bung)
Make it the most work that I've ever seen (bung, bung, bung, bung)
Rewind old tip till we're at the fork point (bung, bung, bung, bung)
Then tell it that it's time to call Con-nectTip
Chainman, I'm so alone (bung, bung, bung, bung)
No local objects to call my own (bung, bung, bung, bung)
Please make sure I have a ref
Mr. Chainman, bring me a tip!
```
This is the last bundle in the #20158 series. Thanks everyone for their diligent review.
I would like to call attention to https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/21766, where a few leftover improvements were collated.
- Remove globals:
- `ChainstateManager g_chainman`
- `CChainState& ChainstateActive()`
- `CChain& ChainActive()`
- Remove all review-only assertions.
ACKs for top commit:
jamesob:
reACK 6f994882de based on the contents of
ariard:
Code Review ACK 6f99488.
jnewbery:
utACK 6f994882deafe62e97f0a889d8bdb8c96dcf913d
achow101:
Code Review ACK 6f994882deafe62e97f0a889d8bdb8c96dcf913d
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 6f994882deafe62e97f0a889d8bdb8c96dcf913d.
Tree-SHA512: 4052ea79360cf0efd81ad0ee3f982e1d93aab1837dcec75f875a56ceda085de078bb3099a2137935d7cc2222004ad88da94b605ef5efef35cb6bc733725debe6
493fb47c577b7564138c883a8f22cbac3619ce44 Make SetupServerArgs callable without NodeContext (Russell Yanofsky)
Pull request description:
`bitcoin-gui` code needs to call `SetupServerArgs` but will not have a `NodeContext` object if it is communicating with an external `bitcoin-node` process, so this just passes `ArgsManager` directly.
---
This PR is part of the [process separation project](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/projects/10). The commit was first part of larger PR #10102.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK 493fb47c577b7564138c883a8f22cbac3619ce44
Tree-SHA512: 94cda4350113237976e32f1935e3602d1e6ea90c29c4434db2094be70dddf4b63702c3094385258bdf1c3e5b52c7d23bbc1f0282bdd4965557eedd5aef9a0fd4
fa72fce7c948185752a01002000ea511809146ed test: Use ConnmanTestMsg from test lib in denialofservice_tests (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
This allows to remove code.
Also, required for https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18470
ACKs for top commit:
mjdietzx:
crACK fa72fce7c948185752a01002000ea511809146ed 👍👍
fanquake:
ACK fa72fce7c948185752a01002000ea511809146ed
Tree-SHA512: 12aa68cde697c0f7c25d60bb0c02783e5462eb3ba39947b0d94a7798bc278e7d5f092f3ab2a3d0547947c3502cde7c4a599419055a57f78ef1f70f9f637e14c7
The return type is already enforced to be void by the
ternary operator:
./test/fuzz/util.h:47:25: error: right operand to ? is void, but left operand is of type *OTHER_TYPE*
((i++ == call_index ? callables() : void()), ...);
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~
3737d35fee283968f12e0772aa27aee4981fce41 fuzz: Terminate immediately if a fuzzing harness ever tries to perform a DNS lookup (belts and suspenders) (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Terminate immediately if a fuzzing harness tries to perform a DNS lookup (belt and suspenders).
Obviously this _should_ never happen, but if it _does_ happen we want immediate termination instead of a DNS lookup :)
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK 3737d35fee283968f12e0772aa27aee4981fce41
Tree-SHA512: 51cd2d32def7f9f052e02f99c354656af1f807cc9fdf592ab765e620bfe660f1ed26e0484763f94aba650424b44959eafaf352bfd0f81aa273e350510e97356e
2667366aaa69447a9de4d819669d254a5ebd4d4b tests: check derivation of P2TR (Pieter Wuille)
7cedafc5412857404e9a6c3450b100cb8ee4081a Add tr() descriptor (derivation only, no signing) (Pieter Wuille)
90fcac365e1616779b40a69736428435df75fdf2 Add TaprootBuilder class (Pieter Wuille)
5f6cc8daa83700d1c949d968a5cf0d935be337b7 Add XOnlyPubKey::CreateTapTweak (Pieter Wuille)
2fbfb1becb3c0c109cd7c30b245b51da22039932 Make consensus checking of tweaks in pubkey.* Taproot-specific (Pieter Wuille)
a4bf84039c00b196b87f969acf6369d72c56ab46 Separate WitnessV1Taproot variant in CTxDestination (Pieter Wuille)
41839bdb89b3777ece2318877b9c7921ecca2472 Avoid dependence on CTxDestination index order (Pieter Wuille)
31df02a07091dbd5e0b315c8e5695e808f3a5505 Change Solver() output for WITNESS_V1_TAPROOT (Pieter Wuille)
4b1cc08f9f94a1e6e1ecba6b97f99b73fb513872 Make XOnlyPubKey act like byte container (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
This is a subset of #21365, to aide review.
This adds support `tr(KEY)` or `tr(KEY,SCRIPT)` or `tr(KEY,{{S1,{{S2,S3},...}},...})` descriptors, describing Taproot outputs with specified internal key, and optionally any number of scripts, in nested groups of 2 inside `{`/`}` if there are more than one. While it permits importing `tr(KEY)`, anything beyond that is just laying foundations for more features later.
Missing:
* Signing support (see #21365)
* Support for more interesting scripts inside the tree (only `pk(KEY)` is supported for now). In particular, a multisig policy based on the new `OP_CHECKSIGADD` opcode would be very useful.
* Inferring `tr()` descriptors from outputs (given sufficient information).
* `getaddressinfo` support.
* MuSig support. Standardizing that is still an ongoing effort, and is generally kind of useless without corresponding PSBT support.
* Convenient ways of constructing descriptors without spendable internal key (especially ones that arent't trivially recognizable as such).
ACKs for top commit:
Sjors:
utACK 2667366 (based on https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21365#issuecomment-846945215 review, plus the new functional test)
achow101:
Code Review ACK 2667366aaa69447a9de4d819669d254a5ebd4d4b
lsilva01:
Tested ACK 2667366aaa
meshcollider:
utACK 2667366aaa69447a9de4d819669d254a5ebd4d4b
Tree-SHA512: 61046fef22c561228338cb178422f0b782ef6587ec8208d3ce2bd07afcff29a664b54b35c6b01226eb70b6540b43f6dd245043d09aa6cb6db1381b6042667e75
5d82a57db4f67506a4e80d186ba76f3a8665e147 contrib: remove torv2 seed nodes (Jon Atack)
5f7e086dac78c9070f8292a1757d7e77e110f772 contrib: update generate-seeds.py to ignore torv2 addresses (Jon Atack)
8be56f0f8ecc54744d572e5678a3089665587b98 p2p, refactor: extract OnionToString() from CNetAddr::ToStringIp() (Jon Atack)
5f9d3c09b4c9cd026cdc7c3a81f91632280917b7 p2p: remove torv2 from CNetAddr::ToStringIP() (Jon Atack)
3d390421440f1cae9a9f2b089561c183ecd1b073 p2p: remove torv2 in SetIP() and ADDR_TORV2_SIZE constant (Jon Atack)
cff5ec477a388ae9aa9fd9ef6a7dad1f678e7d23 p2p: remove pre-addrv2 onions from SerializeV1Array() (Jon Atack)
4192a74413907717d6173e393724b931f2225dd9 p2p: ignore torv2-in-ipv6 addresses in SetLegacyIPv6() (Jon Atack)
1d631e956fffbbc7891ed40be4fd39aeff036c52 p2p: remove BIP155Network::TORV2 from GetBIP155Network() (Jon Atack)
7d1769bc450a98c093a066d6daed84337040dbfb p2p: remove torv2 from SetNetFromBIP155Network() (Jon Atack)
eba9a94b9f56be2fda623e77f19b960425ea1eb5 fuzz: rename CNetAddr/CService deserialize targets (Jon Atack)
c56a1c9b182815018b8bd3d8e6b8c2cb27859607 p2p: drop onions from IsAddrV1Compatible(), no longer relay torv2 (Jon Atack)
f8e94002fcfdc7890d38c23488b1f3a662e97bc4 p2p: remove torv2/ADDR_TORV2_SIZE from SetTor() (Jon Atack)
0f1c58ae87d6a3fe81816500e7b8275420d151d0 test: update feature_proxy to torv3 (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
This patch removes support in Bitcoin Core for Tor v2 onions, which are already removed from the release of Tor 0.4.6.
- no longer serialize/deserialize and relay Tor v2 addresses
- ignore incoming Tor v2 addresses
- remove Tor v2 addresses from the addrman and peers.dat on node launch
- update generate-seeds.py to ignore Tor v2 addresses
- remove Tor v2 hard-coded seeds
Tested with tor-0.4.6.1-alpha (no v2 support) and 0.4.5.7 (v2 support). With the latest Tor (no v2 support), this removes all the warnings like those reported with current master in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/21351
```
<bitcoind debug log>
Socks5() connect to […].onion:8333 failed: general failure
<tor log>
Invalid hostname [scrubbed]; rejecting
```
and the addrman no longer has Tor v2 addresses on launching bitcoind.
```rake
$ ./src/bitcoin-cli -addrinfo
{
"addresses_known": {
"ipv4": 44483,
"ipv6": 8467,
"torv2": 0,
"torv3": 2296,
"i2p": 6,
"total": 55252
}
}
```
After recompiling back to current master and restarting with either of the two Tor versions (0.4.5.7 or 0.4.6.1), -addrinfo initially returns 0 Tor v2 addresses and then begins finding them again.
Ran nodes on this patch over the past week on mainnet/testnet/signet/regtest after building with DEBUG_ADDRMAN.
Verified that this patch bootstraps an onlynet=onion node from the Tor v3 hardcoded fixed seeds on mainnet and testnet and connects to blocks and v3 onion peers: `rm ~/.bitcoin/testnet3/peers.dat ; ./src/bitcoind -testnet -dnsseed=0 -onlynet=onion`
Tested using `addnode`, `getaddednodeinfo`,`addpeeraddress`, `disconnectnode` and `-addrinfo` that a currently valid, connectable Tor v2 peer can no longer be added:
Thanks to Vasil Dimov, Carl Dong, and Wladimir J. van der Laan for their work on BIP155 and Tor v3 that got us here.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK 5d82a57db4f67506a4e80d186ba76f3a8665e147
Tree-SHA512: 590ff3d2f6ef682608596facb4b01f44fef69716d2ab3552ae1655aa225f4bf104f9ee08d6769abb9982a8031de93340df553279ce1f5023771f9f2b651178bb
