9b85a5e2f7e003ca8621feaac9bdd304d19081b4 tests: Test for dumpwallet lock order issue (Andrew Chow)
25d99e6511d8c43b2025a89bcd8295de755346a7 Reorder dumpwallet so that cs_main functions go first (Andrew Chow)
Pull request description:
When a wallet is loaded which has an unconfirmed transaction in the mempool, it will end up establishing the lock order of cs_wallet -> cs_main -> cs_KeyStore. If `dumpwallet` is used on this wallet, then a lock order of cs_wallet -> cs_KeyStore -> cs_main will be used, which causes a lock order assertion. This PR fixes this by reordering `dumpwallet` and `GetKeyBirthTimes` (only used by `dumpwallet`). Specifically, in both functions, the function calls which lock cs_main are done prior to locking cs_KeyStore. This avoids the lock order issue.
Additionally, I have added a test case to `wallet_dump.py`. Of course testing this requires `--enable-debug`.
Fixes#22489
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK 9b85a5e2f7e003ca8621feaac9bdd304d19081b4 🎰
ryanofsky:
Code review ACK 9b85a5e2f7e003ca8621feaac9bdd304d19081b4. Nice to reduce lock scope, and good test!
prayank23:
tACK 9b85a5e2f7
lsilva01:
Tested ACK 9b85a5e2f7 under the same conditions reported in issue #22489 and the `dumpwallet` command completed successfully.
Tree-SHA512: d370a8f415ad64ee6a538ff419155837bcdbb167e3831b06572562289239028c6b46d80b23d227286afe875d9351f3377574ed831549ea426fb926af0e19c755
5a77abd4e657458852875a07692898982f4b1db5 [style] Clean up BroadcastTransaction() (John Newbery)
7282d4c0363ab5152baa34af626cb49afbfddc32 [test] Allow rebroadcast for same-txid-different-wtxid transactions (glozow)
cd48372b67d961fe661990a2c6d3cc3d91478924 [mempool] Allow rebroadcast for same-txid-different-wtxid transactions (John Newbery)
847b6ed48d7bacec9024618922e9b339d2d97676 [test] Test transactions are not re-added to unbroadcast set (Duncan Dean)
2837a9f1eaa2c6bf402d1d9891d9aa84c4a56033 [mempool] Only add a transaction to the unbroadcast set when it's added to the mempool (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
1. Only add a transaction to the unbroadcast set when it's added to the mempool
Currently, if BroadcastTransaction() is called to rebroadcast a
transaction (e.g. by ResendWalletTransactions()), then we add the
transaction to the unbroadcast set. That transaction has already been
broadcast in the past, so peers are unlikely to request it again,
meaning RemoveUnbroadcastTx() won't be called and it won't be removed
from m_unbroadcast_txids.
Net processing will therefore continue to attempt rebroadcast for the
transaction every 10-15 minutes. This will most likely continue until
the node connects to a new peer which hasn't yet seen the transaction
(or perhaps indefinitely).
Fix by only adding the transaction to the broadcast set when it's added to the mempool.
2. Allow rebroadcast for same-txid-different-wtxid transactions
There is some slightly unexpected behaviour when:
- there is already transaction in the mempool (the "mempool tx")
- BroadcastTransaction() is called for a transaction with the same txid
as the mempool transaction but a different witness (the "new tx")
Prior to this commit, if BroadcastTransaction() is called with
relay=true, then it'll call RelayTransaction() using the txid/wtxid of
the new tx, not the txid/wtxid of the mempool tx. For wtxid relay peers,
in SendMessages(), the wtxid of the new tx will be taken from
setInventoryTxToSend, but will then be filtered out from the vector of
wtxids to announce, since m_mempool.info() won't find the transaction
(the mempool contains the mempool tx, which has a different wtxid from
the new tx).
Fix this by calling RelayTransaction() with the wtxid of the mempool
transaction in this case.
The third commit is a comment/whitespace only change to tidy up the BroadcastTransaction() function.
ACKs for top commit:
duncandean:
reACK 5a77abd
naumenkogs:
ACK 5a77abd4e657458852875a07692898982f4b1db5
theStack:
re-ACK 5a77abd4e657458852875a07692898982f4b1db5
lsilva01:
re-ACK 5a77abd4e6
Tree-SHA512: d1a46d32a9f975220e5b432ff6633fac9be01ea41925b4958395b8d641680500dc44476b12d18852e5b674d2d87e4d0160b4483e45d3d149176bdff9f4dc8516
5730a43703f7e5a5ca26245ba3b55fbdd027d0b6 test: Add functional test for AddrFetch connections (Martin Zumsande)
c34ad3309f93979b274a37de013502b05d25fad8 net, rpc: Enable AddrFetch connections for functional testing (Martin Zumsande)
533500d9072b7d5a36a6491784bdeb9247e91fb0 p2p: Add timeout for AddrFetch peers (Martin Zumsande)
b6c5d1e450dde6a54bd785504c923adfb45c7060 p2p: AddrFetch - don't disconnect on self-announcements (Martin Zumsande)
Pull request description:
AddrFetch connections (old name: oneshots) are intended to be short-lived connections on which we ask a peer for addresses via `getaddr` and disconnect after receiving them.
This is done by disconnecting after receiving the first `addr`. However, it is no longer working as intended, because nowadays, the first `addr` a typical bitcoin core node sends is its self-announcement.
So we'll disconnect before the peer gets a chance to answer our `getaddr`.
I checked that this affects both `-seednode` peers specified manually, and DNS seeds when AddrFetch is used as a fallback if DNS doesn't work for us.
The current behavior of getting peers via AddrFetch when starting with an empty addrman would be to connect to the peer, receive its self-announcement and add it to addrman, disconnect, reconnect to the same peer again as a full outbound (no other addresses in addrman) and then receive more `addr`. This is silly and not in line with AddrFetch peer being intended to be short-lived peers.
Fix this by only disconnecting after receiving an `addr` message of size > 1.
[Edit] As per review discussion, this PR now also adds a timeout after which we disconnect if we haven't received any suitable `addr`, and a functional test.
ACKs for top commit:
amitiuttarwar:
reACK 5730a43703f7e5a5ca26245ba3b55fbdd027d0b6
naumenkogs:
ACK 5730a43703f7e5a5ca26245ba3b55fbdd027d0b6
jnewbery:
ACK 5730a43703
Tree-SHA512: 8a81234f37e827705138eb254223f7f3b3bf44a06cb02126fc7990b0d231b9bd8f07d38d185cc30d55bf35548a6fdc286b69602498d875b937e7c58332158bf9
Adds a test for the condition which can trigger a lock order assertion.
Specifically, there must be an unconfirmed transaction in the mempool
which belongs to the wallet being loaded. This will establish the order
of cs_wallet -> cs_main -> cs_KeyStore. Then dumpwallet is called on
that wallet. Previously, this would have used a lock order of cs_wallet
-> cs_KeyStore -> cs_main, but this should be fixed now. The test
ensures that.
a4bcd687c934d47aa3922334e97e579caf5f8124 Improve tests using statistics (John Newbery)
f424d601e1b6870e20bc60f5ccba36d2e210377b Add logging and addr rate limiting statistics (Pieter Wuille)
b4ece8a1cda69cc268d39d21bba59c51fa2fb9ed Functional tests for addr rate limiting (Pieter Wuille)
5648138f5949013331c017c740646e2f4013bc24 Randomize the order of addr processing (Pieter Wuille)
0d64b8f709b4655d8702f810d4876cd8d96ded82 Rate limit the processing of incoming addr messages (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
The rate at which IP addresses are rumoured (through ADDR and ADDRV2 messages) on the network seems to vary from 0 for some non-participating nodes, to 0.005-0.025 addr/s for recent Bitcoin Core nodes. However, the current codebase will happily accept and process an effectively unbounded rate from attackers. There are measures to limit the influence attackers can have on the addrman database (bucket restrictions based on source IPs), but still - there is no need to permit them to feed us addresses at a rate that's orders of magnitude larger than what is common on the network today, especially as it will cause us to spam our peers too.
This PR implements a [token bucket](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Token_bucket) based rate limiter, allowing an average of 0.1 addr/s per connection, with bursts up to 1000 addresses at once. Whitelisted peers as well as responses to GETADDR requests are exempt from the limit. New connections start with 1 token, so as to not interfere with the common practice of peers' self-announcement.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
ACK a4bcd687c934d47aa3922334e97e579caf5f8124
vasild:
ACK a4bcd687c934d47aa3922334e97e579caf5f8124
jnewbery:
ACK a4bcd687c934d47aa3922334e97e579caf5f8124
jonatack:
ACK a4bcd687c934d47aa3922334e97e579caf5f8124
Tree-SHA512: b757de76ad78a53035b622944c4213b29b3b55d3d98bf23585afa84bfba10808299d858649f92269a16abfa75eb4366ea047eae3216f7e2f6d3c455782a16bea
While limitations on the influence of attackers on addrman already
exist (affected buckets are restricted to a subset based on incoming
IP / network group), there is no reason to permit them to let them
feed us addresses at more than a multiple of the normal network
rate.
This commit introduces a "token bucket" rate limiter for the
processing of addresses in incoming ADDR and ADDRV2 messages.
Every connection gets an associated token bucket. Processing an
address in an ADDR or ADDRV2 message from non-whitelisted peers
consumes a token from the bucket. If the bucket is empty, the
address is ignored (it is not forwarded or processed). The token
counter increases at a rate of 0.1 tokens per second, and will
accrue up to a maximum of 1000 tokens (the maximum we accept in a
single ADDR or ADDRV2). When a GETADDR is sent to a peer, it
immediately gets 1000 additional tokens, as we actively desire many
addresses from such peers (this may temporarily cause the token
count to exceed 1000).
The rate limit of 0.1 addr/s was chosen based on observation of
honest nodes on the network. Activity in general from most nodes
is either 0, or up to a maximum around 0.025 addr/s for recent
Bitcoin Core nodes. A few (self-identified, through subver) crawler
nodes occasionally exceed 0.1 addr/s.
7593b06bd1262f438bf34769ecc00e9c22328e56 test: ensure I2P addresses are relayed (Vasil Dimov)
e7468139a1dddd4946bc70697ec38816b3fa8f9b test: make CAddress in functional tests comparable (Vasil Dimov)
33e211d2a442e4555ff3401f92af4ee2f7552568 test: implement ser/unser of I2P addresses in functional tests (Vasil Dimov)
86742811ce3662789ac85334008090a3b54babe3 test: use NODE_* constants instead of magic numbers (Vasil Dimov)
ba45f0270815d54ae3290efc16324c2ff1984565 net: relay I2P addresses even if not reachable (by us) (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
Nodes that can reach the I2P network (have set `-i2psam=`) will relay
I2P addresses even without this patch. However, nodes that can't reach
the I2P network will not. This was done as a precaution in
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20119 before anybody could
connect to I2P because then, for sure, it would have been useless.
Now, however, we have I2P support and a bunch of I2P nodes, so get all
nodes on the network to relay I2P addresses to help with propagation,
similarly to what we do with Tor addresses.
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
ACK 7593b06bd1262f438bf34769ecc00e9c22328e56
naumenkogs:
ACK 7593b06bd1262f438bf34769ecc00e9c22328e56.
laanwj:
Code review ACK 7593b06bd1262f438bf34769ecc00e9c22328e56
kristapsk:
ACK 7593b06bd1262f438bf34769ecc00e9c22328e56. Code looks correct, tested that functional test suite passes and also that `test/functional/p2p_addrv2_replay.py` fails if I undo changes in `IsRelayable()`.
Tree-SHA512: c9feec4a9546cc06bc2fec6d74f999a3c0abd3d15b7c421c21fcf2d610eb94611489e33d61bdcd5a4f42041a6d84aa892f7ae293b0d4f755309a8560b113b735
a3d6ec5bb567481a634638cea7ae37c355119a7b test: move rpc_rawtransaction tests to < 30s group (Jon Atack)
5a1ed96077852c739034c21d399da65db09e7714 test: whitelist rpc_rawtransaction peers to speed up tests (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
Speed up the somewhat slow `rpc_rawtransaction.py` test by more than 3x (from 45-55 seconds to 15 seconds on a laptop running 2 x 2.5GHz).
ACKs for top commit:
mjdietzx:
ACK a3d6ec5bb567481a634638cea7ae37c355119a7b
kristapsk:
ACK a3d6ec5bb567481a634638cea7ae37c355119a7b
theStack:
ACK a3d6ec5bb567481a634638cea7ae37c355119a7b 🐎
brunoerg:
tACK a3d6ec5bb567481a634638cea7ae37c355119a7b
Tree-SHA512: f1d105594c9b5b257a7096b631a6fa5aeb50e330a351f75c2d6ffa7dd73abdb6e1f596a78c16d204a9bac3fe506e0519f9ad96bb8477ab6424c8e18125ccb659
fa80e10d94dbf86da84fc761b09fb631155a5b25 test: Add feature_taproot.py --previous_release (MarcoFalke)
85ccffa26686c6c9adbd18bdde37fc1747281bab test: move releases download incantation to README (Sjors Provoost)
29d6b1da2a862bfbb14e7821979c97416c5400e8 test: previous releases: add v0.20.1 (Sjors Provoost)
Pull request description:
Disabling the new consensus code at runtime is fine, but potentially fragile and incomplete. Fix that by giving the option to run with a version that has been compiled without any taproot code.
ACKs for top commit:
Sjors:
tACK fa80e10
NelsonGaldeman:
tACK fa80e10d94dbf86da84fc761b09fb631155a5b25
Tree-SHA512: 1a1feef823f08c05268759645a8974e1b2d39a024258f5e6acecbe25097aae3fa9302c27262978b40f1aa8e7b525b60c0047199010f2a5d6017dd6434b4066f0
4101ec9d2e05a35c35f587a28f1feee6cebcc61b doc: mention that we enforce port=0 in I2P (Vasil Dimov)
e0a2b390c144e123e2fc8a289fdff36815476964 addrman: reset I2P ports to 0 when loading from disk (Vasil Dimov)
41cda9d075ebcab1dbb950160ebe9d0ba7b5745e test: ensure I2P ports are handled as expected (Vasil Dimov)
4f432bd738c420512a86a51ab3e00323f396b89e net: do not connect to I2P hosts on port!=0 (Vasil Dimov)
1f096f091ebd88efb18154b8894a38122c39624f net: distinguish default port per network (Vasil Dimov)
aeac3bce3ead1f24ca782079ef0defa86fd8cb98 net: change I2P seeds' ports to 0 (Vasil Dimov)
38f900290cc3a839e99bef13474d35e1c02e6b0d net: change assumed I2P port to 0 (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
_This is an alternative to https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21514, inspired by https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21514#issuecomment-815049933. They are mutually exclusive. Just one of them should be merged._
Change assumed ports for I2P to 0 (instead of the default 8333) as this is closer to what actually happens underneath with SAM 3.1 (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21514#issuecomment-812632520, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/21514#issuecomment-816564719).
Don't connect to I2P peers with advertised port != 0 (we don't specify a port to our SAM 3.1 proxy and it always connects to port = 0).
Note, this change:
* Keeps I2P addresses with port != 0 in addrman and relays them to others via P2P gossip. There may be non-bitcoin-core-22.0 peers using SAM 3.2 and for them such addresses may be useful.
* Silently refuses to connect to I2P hosts with port != 0. This is ok for automatically chosen peers from addrman. Not so ok for peers provided via `-addnode` or `-connect` - a user who specifies `foo.b32.i2p:1234` (non zero port) may wonder why "nothing is happening".
Fixes#21389
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK 4101ec9d2e05a35c35f587a28f1feee6cebcc61b
jonatack:
re-ACK 4101ec9d2e05a35c35f587a28f1feee6cebcc61b per `git range-diff efff9c3 0b0ee03 4101ec9`, built with DDEBUG_ADDRMAN, did fairly extensive testing on mainnet both with and without a peers.dat / -dnsseeds=0 to test boostrapping.
Tree-SHA512: 0e3c019e1dc05e54f559275859d3450e0c735596d179e30b66811aad9d5b5fabe3dcc44571e8f7b99f9fe16453eee393d6e153454dd873b9ff14907d4e6354fe
2feec3ce3130961f98ceb030951d0e46d3b9096c net: don't bind on 0.0.0.0 if binds are restricted to Tor (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
The semantic of `-bind` is to restrict the binding only to some address.
If not specified, then the user does not care and we bind to `0.0.0.0`.
If specified then we should honor the restriction and bind only to the
specified address.
Before this change, if no `-bind` is given then we would bind to
`0.0.0.0:8333` and to `127.0.0.1:8334` (incoming Tor) which is ok -
the user does not care to restrict the binding.
However, if only `-bind=addr:port=onion` is given (without ordinary
`-bind=`) then we would bind to `addr:port` _and_ to `0.0.0.0:8333` in
addition.
Change the above to not do the additional bind: if only
`-bind=addr:port=onion` is given (without ordinary `-bind=`) then bind
to `addr:port` (only) and consider incoming connections to that as Tor
and do not advertise it. I.e. a Tor-only node.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
Code review ACK 2feec3ce3130961f98ceb030951d0e46d3b9096c
jonatack:
utACK 2feec3ce3130961f98ceb030951d0e46d3b9096c per `git diff a004833 2feec3c`
hebasto:
ACK 2feec3ce3130961f98ceb030951d0e46d3b9096c, tested on Linux Mint 20.1 (x86_64):
Tree-SHA512: a04483af601706da928958b92dc560f9cfcc78ab0bb9d74414636eed1c6f29ed538ce1fb5a17d41ed82c9c9a45ca94899d0966e7ef93da809c9bcdcdb1d1f040
b7a8cd9963e810264d3b45d0ad15af863965c47a [test] submit same txid different wtxid as mempool tx (glozow)
fdb48163bfbf34f79dc78ffaa2bbf9e39af96687 [validation] distinguish same txid different wtxid in mempool (glozow)
Pull request description:
On master, if you submit a transaction with the same txid but different witness to the mempool, it thinks the transactions are the same. Users submitting through `BroadcastTransaction()` (i.e. `sendrawtransaction` or the wallet) don't get notified that there's a different transaction in the mempool, although it doesn't crash. Users submitting through `testmempoolaccept()` will get a "txn-already-in-mempool" error.
This PR simply distinguishes between `txn-already-in-mempool` and `txn-same-nonwitness-data-in-mempool`, without handling them differently: `sendrawtransaction` still will not throw, but `testmempoolaccept` will give you a different error.
I believe the intention of #19645 is to allow full swaps of transactions that have different witnesses but identical nonwitness data. Returning a different error message + adding a test was suggested: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19645#issuecomment-705109193 so this is that PR.
ACKs for top commit:
naumenkogs:
ACK b7a8cd9963e810264d3b45d0ad15af863965c47a
jnewbery:
Code review ACK b7a8cd9963e810264d3b45d0ad15af863965c47a
theStack:
Code-review ACK b7a8cd9963e810264d3b45d0ad15af863965c47a
darosior:
re-utACK b7a8cd9963e810264d3b45d0ad15af863965c47a
Tree-SHA512: 9c6591edaf8727ba5b4675977adb8cbdef7288584003b6cd659828032dc92d2ae915800a8ef8b6fdffe112c1b660df72297a3dcf2e2e3e1f959c6cb3678c63ee
905d672b743edf31531d095ffe800449eaffec69 test: use script_util helpers for creating P2W{PKH,SH} scripts (Sebastian Falbesoner)
285a65ccfde2e811cfe01e916b998c02ee534a97 test: use script_util helpers for creating P2SH scripts (Sebastian Falbesoner)
b57b633b942da162045b1fe7743a8abdfeaf60e2 test: use script_util helpers for creating P2PKH scripts (Sebastian Falbesoner)
61b6a017a9f99ef072b2d1980dd547eb20093352 test: wallet util: fix multisig P2SH-P2WSH script creation (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
PR #18788 (commit 08067aebfd7e838e6ce6b030c31a69422260fc6f) introduced functions to generate output scripts for various types. This PR replaces all manual CScript creations in the P2PKH, P2SH, P2WPKH, P2WSH formats with those helpers in order to increase readability and maintainability over the functional test codebase. The first commit fixes a bug in the wallet_util helper module w.r.t. to P2SH-P2WSH script creation (the result is not used in any test so far, hence it can still be seen as refactoring).
The following table shows a summary of the output script patterns tackled in this PR:
| Type | master branch | PR branch |
| ---------- | ------------- | ------------- |
| P2PKH | `CScript([OP_DUP, OP_HASH160, hash160(key), OP_EQUALVERIFY, OP_CHECKSIG])` | `key_to_p2pkh_script(key)` |
| | `CScript([OP_DUP, OP_HASH160, keyhash, OP_EQUALVERIFY, OP_CHECKSIG])` | `keyhash_to_p2pkh_script(keyhash)` |
| P2SH | `CScript([OP_HASH160, hash160(script), OP_EQUAL])` | `script_to_p2sh_script(script)` |
| P2WPKH | `CScript([OP_0, hash160(key)])` | `key_to_p2wpkh_script(key)` |
| P2WSH | `CScript([OP_0, sha256(script)])` | `script_to_p2wsh_script(script)` |
Note that the `key_to_...` helpers can't be used if an invalid key size (not 33 or 65 bytes) is passed, which is the case in some rare instances where the scripts still have to be created manually.
Possible follow-up ideas:
* further simplify by identifying P2SH-wrapped scripts and using `key_to_p2sh_p2wpkh_script()` and `script_to_p2sh_p2wsh_script()` helpers
* introduce and use `key_to_p2pk_script()` helper for P2PK scripts
ACKs for top commit:
rajarshimaitra:
tACK 905d672b74
LarryRuane:
tACK 905d672b743edf31531d095ffe800449eaffec69
0xB10C:
ACK 905d672b743edf31531d095ffe800449eaffec69
MarcoFalke:
review ACK 905d672b743edf31531d095ffe800449eaffec69 🕹
Tree-SHA512: 7ccfe69699bc81168ac122b03536720013355c1b2fbb088355b616015318644c4d1cd27e20c4f56c89ad083ae609add4bc838cf6316794d0edb0ce9cf7fa0fd8
The semantic of `-bind` is to restrict the binding only to some address.
If not specified, then the user does not care and we bind to `0.0.0.0`.
If specified then we should honor the restriction and bind only to the
specified address.
Before this change, if no `-bind` is given then we would bind to
`0.0.0.0:8333` and to `127.0.0.1:8334` (incoming Tor) which is ok -
the user does not care to restrict the binding.
However, if only `-bind=addr:port=onion` is given (without ordinary
`-bind=`) then we would bind to `addr:port` _and_ to `0.0.0.0:8333` in
addition.
Change the above to not do the additional bind: if only
`-bind=addr:port=onion` is given (without ordinary `-bind=`) then bind
to `addr:port` (only) and consider incoming connections to that as Tor
and do not advertise it. I.e. a Tor-only node.
This reject reason is triggered for non-coinbase transactions with
a coinbase-like outpoint, i.e. hash=0, n=0xffffffff.
Note that the invalid tx templates are currently used in the
functional tests feature_block.py and p2p_invalid_tx.py.
c4ddee64c7f80eee05a95116ef1b1dc8a7601183 test: Add test for replacement relay fee check (Antoine Riard)
Pull request description:
This PR adds rename the `reject_reason` of our implementation of BIP125 rule 4 and adds missing functional test coverage. Note, `insufficient fee` is already the `reject_reason` of few others `PreChecks` replacement checks and as such might be confusing.
> The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting. For example, if the minimum relay fee is 1 satoshi/byte and the replacement transaction is 500 bytes total, then the replacement must pay a fee at least 500 satoshis higher than the sum of the originals.
```
// Finally in addition to paying more fees than the conflicts the
// new transaction must pay for its own bandwidth.
CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees;
if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))
{
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee",
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s",
hash.ToString(),
FormatMoney(nDeltaFees),
FormatMoney(::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))));
}
```
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
cr ACK c4ddee64c7f80eee05a95116ef1b1dc8a7601183
glozow:
ACK c4ddee6, one small suggestion if you retouch.
Tree-SHA512: 7c5d1065db6e6fe57a9f083bf051a7a55eb9892de3a2888679d4a6853491608c93b6e35887ef383a9988d14713fa13a0b1d6134b7354af5fd54765f0d4e98568
3efaf83c75cd8dc2fa084537b8ed6715fb58c04d wallet: deactivate descriptor (S3RK)
6737d9655bcf527afbd85d610d805a2d0fd28c4f test: wallet importdescriptors update existing (S3RK)
586f1d53d60880ea2873d860f95e3390016620d1 wallet: maintain SPK consistency on internal flag change (S3RK)
f1b7db14748d9ee04735b4968366d33bc89aea23 wallet: don't mute exceptions in importdescriptors (S3RK)
bf68ebc1cd555f791103f81adc9111e0e55c8003 wallet: allow to import same descriptor twice (S3RK)
Pull request description:
Rationale: allow updating existing descriptors with `importdescriptors` command.
Currently if you run same `importdescriptors` command twice with a descriptor containing private key you will get very confusing error — `Missing required fields`. What happens is that Wallet tries to write imported private key to the disk, but it exists already so we get `DB_KEYEXIST (-30995)` from BerkelyDB. Please note, that we set `DB_NOOVERWRITE` (I guess not to lose some keys accidentally). The exception is caught in `catch (...)` in rpcdump.cpp with a generic error.
With this PR if a descriptor is already present than we will update its activeness, internalness, label, range and next_index.
For the range only expansion is allowed (range start can only decrease, range end increase).
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
re-ACK 3efaf83c75cd8dc2fa084537b8ed6715fb58c04d
meshcollider:
Code review ACK 3efaf83c75cd8dc2fa084537b8ed6715fb58c04d
jonatack:
Light ACK 3efaf83c75cd8dc2fa084537b8ed6715fb58c04d per `git range-diff a000cb0 5d96704 3efaf83` and as a sanity check, re-debug-built on debian with gcc 10.2.1 and clang 11, ran wallet_importdescriptors.py
Tree-SHA512: 122c4b621d64ec8a3b625f3aed9f01a2b5cbaf2029ad0325b5ff38d67fff5cd35324335fabe2dd5169548b01b267c81be6ae0f5c834342f3d5f6eeed515c4843
754f134a50cc56cdf0baf996d909c992770fcc97 wallet: Add error message to GetReservedDestination (Andrew Chow)
87a0e7a3b7c0ffd545e537bd497cdc3e67d045f6 Disallow bech32m addresses for legacy wallet things (Andrew Chow)
6dbe4d10728f882986ed0d9ed77bc736f051c662 Use BECH32M for tr() desc, WitV1Taproot, and WitUnknown CTxDests (Andrew Chow)
699dfcd8ad9487a4e04c1ffc68211e84e126b3d2 Opportunistically use bech32m change addresses if available (Andrew Chow)
0262536c34567743e527dad46912c9ba493252cd Add OutputType::BECH32M (Andrew Chow)
177c15d2f7cd5406ddbce8217fc023057539b828 Limit LegacyScriptPubKeyMan address types (Andrew Chow)
Pull request description:
Currently bech32m addresses are classfied as bech32. Because bech32m is incompatible with bech32, we need to define a new `OutputType` for it so that it can be handled correctly. This PR adds `OutputType::BECH32M`, updates all of the relevant `OutputType` classifications, and handle requests for bech32m addresses. There is now a `bech32m` address type string that can be used.
* `tr()` descriptors now report their output type as `OutputType::BECH32M`. `WtinessV1Taproot` and `WitnessUnknown` are also classified as `OutputType::BECH32M`.
* Bech32m addresses are completely disabled for legacy wallets. They cannot be imported (explicitly disallowed in `importaddress` and `importmulti`), will not be created when getting all destinations for a pubkey, and will not be added with `addmultisigaddress`. Additional protections have been added to `LegacyScriptPubKeyMan` to disallow attempting to retrieve bech32m addresses.
* Since Taproot multisigs are not implemented yet, `createmultisig` will also disallow the bech32m address type.
* As Taproot is not yet active, `DescriptorScriptPubKeyMan` cannot and will not create a `tr()` descriptor. Protections have been added to make sure this cannot occur.
* The change address type detection algorithm has been updated to return `bech32m` when there is a segwit v1+ output script and the wallet has a bech32m `ScriptPubKeyMan`, falling back to bech32 if one is not available.
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
re-review ACK 754f134a50cc56cdf0baf996d909c992770fcc97
Sjors:
re-utACK 754f134: only change is switching to `bech32m` in two `wallet_taproot.py` test cases.
fjahr:
re-ACK 754f134a50cc56cdf0baf996d909c992770fcc97
jonatack:
ACK 754f134a50cc56cdf0baf996d909c992770fcc97
Tree-SHA512: 6ea90867d3631d0d438e2b08ce6ed930f37d01323224661e8e38f183ea5ee2ab65b5891394a3612c7382a1aff907b457616c6725665a10c320174017b998ca9f
fadddd13eef4428f5fa7237583d4be41a9335cd9 test: Add missing syncwithvalidationinterfacequeue (MarcoFalke)
faa211fc6e3d4984b8edff1d762dd4cba205d982 test: Misc cleanup (MarcoFalke)
fa1668bf5084a190b26b022b9e625a7be3defa6e test: Run pep-8 (MarcoFalke)
facd97ae0f0d816107aa3bc9de321244200636a0 scripted-diff: Renames (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
The index on the block filters is running in the background on the validation interface. To avoid intermittent test failures, it needs to be synced.
Also other cleanups.
ACKs for top commit:
lsilva01:
Tested ACK fadddd13ee on Ubuntu 20.04
Tree-SHA512: d858405db426a2f9d5620059dd88bcead4e3fba3ccc6bd8023f624b768fbcfa2203246fb0b2db620490321730d990f0e78063b21a26988c969cb126d4bd697bd
bdb8b9a347e68f80a2e8d44ce5590a2e8214b6bb test: doc: improve doc for `from_hex` helper (mention `to_hex` alternative) (Sebastian Falbesoner)
191405420815d49ab50184513717a303fc2744d6 scripted-diff: test: rename `FromHex` to `from_hex` (Sebastian Falbesoner)
a79396fe5f8f81c78cf84117a87074c6ff6c9d95 test: remove `ToHex` helper, use .serialize().hex() instead (Sebastian Falbesoner)
2ce7b47958c4a10ba20dc86c011d71cda4b070a5 test: introduce `tx_from_hex` helper for tx deserialization (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
There are still many functional tests that perform conversions from a hex-string to a message object (deserialization) manually. This PR identifies all those instances and replaces them with a newly introduced helper `tx_from_hex`.
Instances were found via
* `git grep "deserialize.*BytesIO"`
and some of them manually, when it were not one-liners.
Further, the helper `ToHex` was removed and simply replaced by `.serialize().hex()`, since now both variants are in use (sometimes even within the same test) and using the helper doesn't really have an advantage in readability. (see discussion https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/22257#discussion_r652404782)
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review re-ACK bdb8b9a347e68f80a2e8d44ce5590a2e8214b6bb 😁
Tree-SHA512: e25d7dc85918de1d6755a5cea65471b07a743204c20ad1c2f71ff07ef48cc1b9ad3fe5f515c1efaba2b2e3d89384e7980380c5d81895f9826e2046808cd3266e
6168eb06b2044f00f18727b955b672fc91c60bd7 [test] Prevent intermittent issue (Amiti Uttarwar)
1d8193e2a2950fd957654b601e85ab888899c394 [test] Remove GetAddrStore class (Amiti Uttarwar)
ef2f149bf2d12e2d14e441fdf701808f0f1dfb8e [test] Update GetAddrStore callers to use AddrReceiver (Amiti Uttarwar)
e8c67ea19ac4c0aec4a0b449ac3a4152f80dfff5 [test] Add functionality to AddrReceiver (Amiti Uttarwar)
09dc073cff250afd47a3e219f35d1257add764e9 [test] Allow AddrReceiver to be used more generally (Amiti Uttarwar)
Pull request description:
A test refactor broken out from #21528 & a fix to #22243.
This PR:
1. consolidates the two helper classes into one, with the intent of making the test logic more clear & usable as we add more subtests to the file
2. hopefully fixes the test flakiness by bumping up the mocktime interval to ensure `m_next_addr_send` timer triggers
ACKs for top commit:
mzumsande:
Code-Review ACK 6168eb06b2044f00f18727b955b672fc91c60bd7
lsilva01:
Tested ACK 6168eb06b2 on Ubuntu 20.04
brunoerg:
tACK 6168eb06b2044f00f18727b955b672fc91c60bd7
Tree-SHA512: 248324f9d37e0e5ffe4acc437cd72ad9a2960abc868a97c6040a36e6ea8b59029127ac4f63fcf67d981a5bb4dbf2334bb2c23c541fae8e910d5523884bcedcba
d637a9b397816e34652d0c4d383308e39770737a Taproot descriptor inference (Pieter Wuille)
c7388e5ada394b7fe94d6263fb02e9dd28ab367e Report address as solvable based on inferred descriptor (Pieter Wuille)
29e5dd1a5b9a1879e6c3c7e153b2e6f33a79e905 consensus refactor: extract ComputeTapleafHash, ComputeTaprootMerkleRoot (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
Includes:
* First commit from #21365, adding TaprootSpendData in SigningProvider
* A refactor to expose ComputeTapleafHash and ComputeTaprootMerkleRoot from script/interpreter
* A tiny change to make `getaddressinfo` report tr() descriptors as solvable (so that inferred descriptors are shown), despite not having signing code for them.
* Logic to infer the script tree back from TaprootSpendData, and then use that to infer descriptors.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
re-ACK d637a9b397816e34652d0c4d383308e39770737a
Sjors:
re-utACK d637a9b
meshcollider:
Code review ACK d637a9b397816e34652d0c4d383308e39770737a
Tree-SHA512: 5ab9b95da662382d8549004be4a1297a577d7caca6b068f875c7c9343723931d03fa9cbf133de11f83b74e4851490ce820fb80413c77b9e8495a5f812e505d86
bb719a08db173a753984a04534de6f148b87b17a style: remove () from assert in rpc_setban.py (Vasil Dimov)
24b10ebda301548b8ff4b0c73fefc367ad5dc22b doc: fix grammar in doc/files.md (Vasil Dimov)
dd4e957dcdfc971a4a971995ff2db9fb787d23c3 test: ensure banlist can be read from disk after restart (Vasil Dimov)
d197977ae2076903ed12ab7616a7f93e88be02e1 banman: save the banlist in a JSON format on disk (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
Save the banlist in `banlist.json` instead of `banlist.dat`.
This makes it possible to store Tor v3 entries in the banlist on disk
(and any other addresses that cannot be serialized in addrv1 format).
Only read `banlist.dat` if it exists and `banlist.json` does not exist (first start after an upgrade).
Supersedes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/20904
Resolves https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/19748
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
Code review re-ACK bb719a08db173a753984a04534de6f148b87b17a per `git range-diff 6a67366 4b52c72 bb719a0`
achow101:
Code Review ACK bb719a08db173a753984a04534de6f148b87b17a
Tree-SHA512: fc135c3a1fe20bcf5d008ce6bea251b4135e56c78bf8f750b4bd8144c095b81ffe165133cdc7e4715875eec7e7c4e13ad9f5d2450b21102af063d7c8abf716b6
fafd9165e911bf33d6212ca8a613b71878c82449 test: Add missing sync_all to feature_coinstatsindex (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Sync the blocks before invalidating them to ensure all nodes are on the right tip. Otherwise nodes[0] might stay on the "stale" block and the test fails (intermittently)
ACKs for top commit:
jamesob:
crACK fafd9165e9
Tree-SHA512: ca567b97b839b56c91d52831eaac18d8c843d376be90c9fd8b49d2eb4a46b801a1d2402996d5dfe2bef3e2c9bd75d19ed443e3f42cc4679c5f20043ba556efc8
Adds an error output parameter to all GetReservedDestination functions
so that callers can get the actual reason that a change address could
not be fetched. This more closely matches GetNewDestination. This allows
for more granular error messages, such as one that indicates that
bech32m addresses cannot be generated yet.
We don't want the legacy wallet to ever have bech32m addresses so don't
allow importing them. This includes addmultisigaddress as that is a
legacy wallet only RPC
Additionally, bech32m multisigs are not available yet, so disallow them
in createmultisig.
