Move util/message to common/signmessage so it is named more clearly, and
because the util library is not supposed to depend on other libraries besides
the crypto library. The signmessage functions use CKey, CPubKey, PKHash, and
DecodeDestination functions in the consensus and common libraries.
0fb17bf61a40b73a2b81a18e70b3de180c917f22 [log] updates in TxOrphanage (glozow)
b16da7eda76944719713be68b61f03d4acdd3e16 [functional test] attackers sending mutated orphans (glozow)
6675f6428d653bf7a53537bd773114f4fb5ba53f [unit test] TxOrphanage handling of same-txid-different-witness txns (glozow)
8923edfc1f12ebc6a074651c084ba7d249074799 [p2p] allow entries with the same txid in TxOrphanage (glozow)
c31f148166f01a9167d82501a77823785d28a841 [refactor] TxOrphanage::EraseTx by wtxid (glozow)
efcc5930175f31b685adb4627a038d9f0848eb1f [refactor] TxOrphanage::HaveTx only by wtxid (glozow)
7e475b9648bbee04f5825b922ba0399373eaa5a9 [p2p] don't query orphanage by txid (glozow)
Pull request description:
Part of #27463 in the "make orphan handling more robust" section.
Currently the main map in `TxOrphanage` is indexed by txid; we do not allow 2 transactions with the same txid into TxOrphanage. This means that if we receive a transaction and want to store it in orphanage, we'll fail to do so if a same-txid-different-witness version of the tx already exists in the orphanage. The existing orphanage entry can stay until it expires 20 minutes later, or until we find that it is invalid.
This means an attacker can try to block/delay us accepting an orphan transaction by sending a mutated version of the child ahead of time. See included test.
Prior to #28970, we don't rely on the orphanage for anything and it would be relatively difficult to guess what transaction will go to a node's orphanage. After the parent(s) are accepted, if anybody sends us the correct transaction, we'll end up accepting it. However, this is a bit more painful for 1p1c: it's easier for an attacker to tell when a tx is going to hit a node's orphanage, and we need to store the correct orphan + receive the parent before we'll consider the package. If we start out with a bad orphan, we can't evict it until we receive the parent + try the 1p1c, and then we'll need to download the real child, put it in orphanage, download the parent again, and then retry 1p1c.
ACKs for top commit:
AngusP:
ACK 0fb17bf61a40b73a2b81a18e70b3de180c917f22
itornaza:
trACK 0fb17bf61a40b73a2b81a18e70b3de180c917f22
instagibbs:
ACK 0fb17bf61a40b73a2b81a18e70b3de180c917f22
theStack:
ACK 0fb17bf61a40b73a2b81a18e70b3de180c917f22
sr-gi:
crACK [0fb17bf](0fb17bf61a)
stickies-v:
ACK 0fb17bf61a40b73a2b81a18e70b3de180c917f22
Tree-SHA512: edcbac7287c628bc27036920c2d4e4f63ec65087fbac1de9319c4f541515d669fc4e5fdc30c8b9a248b720da42b89153d388e91c7bf5caf4bc5b3b931ded1f59
58594c7040241f2312b0b8735a8baf0412674613 fuzz: txorphan tests fixups (Sergi Delgado Segura)
Pull request description:
Motivated by https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28970#discussion_r1576401327
Adds the following fixups in txorphan fuzz tests:
- Don't bond the output count of the created orphans to the number of available coins
- Allow duplicate inputs but don't store duplicate outpoints
Most significantly, this gets rid of the `duplicate_input` flag altogether, making the test easier to reason about. Notice how, under normal conditions, duplicate inputs would be caught by `MemPoolAccept::PreChecks`, however, no validations checks are run on the test before adding data to the orphanage (neither were they before this patch)
## Rationale
The way the test is currently written, duplicate inputs are allowed based on a random flag (`duplicate_input`). If the flag is unset, upon selecting an outpoint as input for a new transaction, the input is popped to prevent re-selection and later re-added to the collection (once all inputs have been picked). However, the re-addition to the collection is performed independently of whether the flag was set or not. This means that, if the flag is set, the selected inputs are duplicated which in turn makes these inputs more likely to be re-picked in the following iteration of the loop.
Additionally, both the input and output count of the transaction are bonded to the number of available outpoints. This makes sense for the former, but the latter shouldn't be.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
utACK 58594c7040241f2312b0b8735a8baf0412674613
glozow:
ACK 58594c7
instagibbs:
ACK 58594c7040241f2312b0b8735a8baf0412674613
Tree-SHA512: e97cc2a43e388f87b64d2e4e45f929dd5b0dd85d668dd693b75e4c9ceea734cd7645952385d428208d07b70e1aafbec84cc2ec264a2e07d36fc8ba3e97885a8d
It seems modern compilers don't realize that all invocations of operator""_mst
can be evaluated at compile time, despite the constexpr keyword.
Since C++20, we can force them to evaluate at compile time, turning all the
miniscript type constants into actual compile-time constants.
It appears that MSVC does not support consteval operator"" when used inside
certain expressions. For the few places where this happens, define a
constant outside the operator call.
Co-Authored-By: Hennadii Stepanov <32963518+hebasto@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds the following fixups in txorphan fuzz tests:
- Don't bond the output count of the created orphans based on the number of available coins
- Allow duplicate inputs, when applicable, but don't store duplicate outpoints
Rationale
---------
The way the test is currently written, duplicate inputs are allowed based on a random flag (`duplicate_input`).
If the flag is unset, upon selecting an outpoint as input for a new transaction, the input is popped to prevent re-selection,
and later re-added to the collection (once all inputs have been picked). However, the re-addition to the collection is performed independently of whether the flag was set or not.
This means that, if the flag is set, the selected inputs are duplicated which in turn makes these inputs more likely to be re-picked in the following iteration of the loop.
Additionally, both the input and output count of the transaction and bonded to the number of available outpoints. This makes sense for the former, but the latter shouldn't be.
c6be144c4b774a03a8bcab5a165768cf81e9b06b Remove timedata (stickies-v)
92e72b5d0d49aa395e626c238bc28aba8e4c3d44 [net processing] Move IgnoresIncomingTxs to PeerManagerInfo (dergoegge)
7d9c3ec622d73a98d07ab3cee78751718982a5bc [net processing] Introduce PeerManagerInfo (dergoegge)
ee178dfcc1175e0af8163216c9c024f4bfc97965 Add TimeOffsets helper class (stickies-v)
55361a15d1aa6984051441bce88112000688fb43 [net processing] Use std::chrono for type-safe time offsets (stickies-v)
038fd979effb54ee76ce1b7cf078e920c652326a [net processing] Move nTimeOffset to net_processing (dergoegge)
Pull request description:
[An earlier approach](1d226ae1f9/) in #28956 involved simplifying and refactoring the network-adjusted time calculation logic, but this was eventually [left out](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28956#issuecomment-1904214370) of the PR to make it easier for reviewers to focus on consensus logic changes.
Since network-adjusted time is now only used for warning/informational purposes, cleaning up the logic (building on @dergoegge's approach in #28956) should be quite straightforward and uncontroversial. The main changes are:
- Previously, we would only calculate the time offset from the first 199 outbound peers that we connected to. This limitation is now removed, and we have a proper rolling calculation. I've reduced the set to 50 outbound peers, which seems plenty.
- Previously, we would automatically use the network-adjusted time if the difference was < 70 mins, and warn the user if the difference was larger than that. Since there is no longer any automated time adjustment, I've changed the warning threshold to ~~20~~ 10 minutes (which is an arbitrary number).
- Previously, a warning would only be raised once, and then never again until node restart. This behaviour is now updated to 1) warn to log for every new outbound peer for as long as we appear out of sync, 2) have the RPC warning toggled on/off whenever we go in/out of sync, and 3) have the GUI warn whenever we are out of sync (again), but limited to 1 messagebox per 60 minutes
- no more globals
- remove the `-maxtimeadjustment` startup arg
Closes#4521
ACKs for top commit:
sr-gi:
Re-ACK [c6be144](c6be144c4b)
achow101:
reACK c6be144c4b774a03a8bcab5a165768cf81e9b06b
dergoegge:
utACK c6be144c4b774a03a8bcab5a165768cf81e9b06b
Tree-SHA512: 1063d639542e882186cdcea67d225ad1f97847f44253621a8c4b36c4d777e8f5cb0efe86bc279f01e819d33056ae4364c3300cc7400c087fb16c3f39b3e16b96
e518a8bf8abf3d7b83c9013f56d0dca18ae04d6f [functional test] opportunistic 1p1c package submission (glozow)
87c5c524d63c833cf490c7f2f73d72695ad480df [p2p] opportunistically accept 1-parent-1-child packages (glozow)
6c51e1d7d021ed6523107a6db87a865aaa8fc4c9 [p2p] add separate rejections cache for reconsiderable txns (glozow)
410ebd6efaf20fe4715c9b825103b74db69f35ac [fuzz] break out parent functions and add GetChildrenFrom* coverage (glozow)
d095316c1c23e9460dfbd9fdbaf292063adcd080 [unit test] TxOrphanage::GetChildrenFrom* (glozow)
2f51cd680fb4323f1c792dae37d4c4e0e0e35804 [txorphanage] add method to get all orphans spending a tx (glozow)
092c978a42e8f4a02291b994713505ba8aac8b28 [txpackages] add canonical way to get hash of package (glozow)
c3c1e15831c463df7968b028a77e787da7e6256d [doc] restore comment about why we check if ptx HasWitness before caching rejected txid (glozow)
6f4da19cc3b1b7cd23cb4be95a6bb9acb79eb3bf guard against MempoolAcceptResult::m_replaced_transactions (glozow)
Pull request description:
This enables 1p1c packages to propagate in the "happy case" (i.e. not reliable if there are adversaries) and contains a lot of package relay-related code. See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27463 for overall package relay tracking.
Rationale: This is "non-robust 1-parent-1-child package relay" which is immediately useful.
- Relaying 1-parent-1-child CPFP when mempool min feerate is high would be a subset of all package relay use cases, but a pretty significant improvement over what we have today, where such transactions don't propagate at all. [1]
- Today, a miner can run this with a normal/small maxmempool to get revenue from 1p1c CPFP'd transactions without losing out on the ones with parents below mempool minimum feerate.
- The majority of this code is useful for building more featureful/robust package relay e.g. see the code in #27742.
The first 2 commits are followups from #29619:
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29619#discussion_r1523094034
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29619#discussion_r1519819257
Q: What makes this short of a more full package relay feature?
(1) it only supports packages in which 1 of the parents needs to be CPFP'd by the child. That includes 1-parent-1-child packages and situations in which the other parents already pay for themselves (and are thus in mempool already when the package is submitted). More general package relay is a future improvement that requires more engineering in mempool and validation - see #27463.
(2) We rely on having kept the child in orphanage, and don't make any attempt to protect it while we wait to receive the parent. If we are experiencing a lot of orphanage churn (e.g. an adversary is purposefully sending us a lot of transactions with missing inputs), we will fail to submit packages. This limitation has been around for 12+ years, see #27742 which adds a token bucket scheme for protecting package-related orphans at a limited rate per peer.
(3) Our orphan-handling logic is somewhat opportunistic; we don't make much effort to resolve an orphan beyond asking the child's sender for the parents. This means we may miss packages if the first sender fails to give us the parent (intentionally or unintentionally). To make this more robust, we need receiver-side logic to retry orphan resolution with multiple peers. This is also an existing problem which has a proposed solution in #28031.
[1]: see this writeup and its links 02ec218c78/bip-0331.mediawiki (propagate-high-feerate-transactions)
ACKs for top commit:
sr-gi:
tACK e518a8bf8abf3d7b83c9013f56d0dca18ae04d6f
instagibbs:
reACK e518a8bf8abf3d7b83c9013f56d0dca18ae04d6f
theStack:
Code-review ACK e518a8bf8abf3d7b83c9013f56d0dca18ae04d6f 📦
dergoegge:
light Code review ACK e518a8bf8abf3d7b83c9013f56d0dca18ae04d6f
achow101:
ACK e518a8bf8abf3d7b83c9013f56d0dca18ae04d6f
Tree-SHA512: 632579fbe7160cb763bbec6d82ca0dab484d5dbbc7aea90c187c0b9833b8d7c1e5d13b8587379edd3a3b4a02a5a1809020369e9cd09a4ebaf729921f65c15943
cc15c5bfd1eb3903de246c124702a7c66c687008 fuzz: don't allow adding duplicate transactions to the mempool (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
Filter duplicate transaction ids from being added to the mempool in the `partially_downloaded_block` fuzz target.
I think a prerequisite for calling `CTxMemPool::addUnchecked` should be that the underlying txid doesn't already exist in the mempool (otherwise `addUnchecked` would need a way to return failure, which we don't currently have).
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
utACK cc15c5bfd1eb3903de246c124702a7c66c687008 makes sense to me
maflcko:
lgtm ACK cc15c5bfd1eb3903de246c124702a7c66c687008
brunoerg:
ACK cc15c5bfd1eb3903de246c124702a7c66c687008
dergoegge:
utACK cc15c5bfd1eb3903de246c124702a7c66c687008
Tree-SHA512: 85f84ce405aba584e6d00391515f0a86c5648ce8b2da69036e50a6c1f6833d050d09b1972cc5ffbe7c4edb3e5f7f965ef34bd839deeddac27a889cc8d2e53b8f
It's very hard to randomly construct a transaction that would be the
parent of an existing orphanage tx. For functions like
AddChildrenToWorkSet and GetChildren that take orphan parents, use a tx
that was previously constructed.
992c714451676cee33d3dff49f36329423270c1c common: Don't terminate on null character in UrlDecode (Fabian Jahr)
099fa571511f113e0056d4bc27b3153a42f9dc65 scripted-diff: Modernize name of urlDecode function and param (Fabian Jahr)
8f39aaae417c33490e0e41fb97620eb23ced3d05 refactor: Remove hooking code for urlDecode (Fabian Jahr)
650d43ec15f7a3ae38126f65ef8fa0b1fd3ee936 refactor: Replace libevent use in urlDecode with our own code (Fabian Jahr)
46bc6c2aaa613eef526b21a06bf21e8edde31a88 test: Add unit tests for urlDecode (Fabian Jahr)
Pull request description:
Fixes#29654 (as a side-effect)
Removing dependencies is a general goal of the project and the xz backdoor has been an additional wake up call recently. Libevent shows many of the same symptoms, few maintainers and slow releases. While libevent can not be removed completely over night we should start removing it’s usage where it's possible, ideally with the end goal to removing it completely.
This is a pretty easy win in that direction. The [`evhttp_uridecode` function from libevent](e0a4574ba2/http.c (L3542)) we were using in `urlDecode` could be easily emulated in fewer LOC. This also ports the [applicable test vectors over from libevent](https://github.com/libevent/libevent/blob/master/test/regress_http.c#L3430).
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 992c714451676cee33d3dff49f36329423270c1c
theStack:
Code-review ACK 992c714451676cee33d3dff49f36329423270c1c
maflcko:
ACK 992c714451676cee33d3dff49f36329423270c1c 👈
stickies-v:
ACK 992c714451676cee33d3dff49f36329423270c1c
Tree-SHA512: 78f76ae7ab3b6710eab2aaac20f55eb0da7803e057eaa6220e865f328666a5399ef1a479702aaf630b2f974ad3aa15e2b6adac9c11bc8c3d4be21e8af1667fea
016ed248ba0ae64e3f0c93bb47a2cd9b5e49cd85 fuzz: explicitly cap the vsize of RBFs for diagram checks (Greg Sanders)
Pull request description:
In master we are hitting a case where vsize transactions much larger than max standard size are causing an overflow in not-yet-exposed RBF diagram checking code: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29757#issuecomment-2049220195
`ConsumeTxMemPoolEntry` is creating entries with tens of thousands of sigops cost, causing the resulting RBFs to be "overly large".
To fix this I cause the fuzz test to stop adding transactions to the mempool when we reach a potential overflow of `int32_t`.
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
ACK 016ed248ba0ae64e3f0c93bb47a2cd9b5e49cd85
marcofleon:
ACK 016ed248ba0ae64e3f0c93bb47a2cd9b5e49cd85. I ran libFuzzer on `package_rbf` on the current master branch until the overflow was encountered. Then I built the PR branch and ran the fuzzer using the crash input.
Tree-SHA512: b3ffc98d2c4598eb3010edd58b9370aab1441aafbb1044c83b2b90c17dfe9135b8de9dba475dd0108863c1ffedede443cd978e95231a41cf1f0715629197fa51
4ba1d0b55339c3ea90e2bcd64662a06f0f90dd46 fuzz: Add coverage for client_maxfeerate (Greg Sanders)
91d7d8f22a1c528db14fa743c66cd861ea00e84b AcceptMultipleTransactions: Fix workspace client_maxfeerate (Greg Sanders)
f3aa5bd5eb6d1088f98a4dc7daaab0e17a7d5529 fill_mempool: assertions and docsctring update (Greg Sanders)
a3da63e8febe475f2250f6432bca237d31fa9107 Move fill_mempool to util function (Greg Sanders)
73b68bd8b4f9447e30091c7f8c3dc91a086bd93b fill_mempool: remove subtest-specific comment (Greg Sanders)
Pull request description:
Bug causes an `Assume()` failure due to the expectation that the individual result should be invalid when done over `submitpackage` via rpc.
Bug introduced by https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28950 , and I discovered it rebasing https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28984 since it's easier to hit in that test scenario.
Tests in place were only checking `AcceptSingleTransaction`-level checks due to package evaluation only triggering when minfee is too high for the parent transaction.
Added test along with fix, moving the fill_mempool utility into a common area for re-use.
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
reACK 4ba1d0b55339c3ea90e2bcd64662a06f0f90dd46
theStack:
ACK 4ba1d0b55339c3ea90e2bcd64662a06f0f90dd46
ismaelsadeeq:
re-ACK 4ba1d0b553 via [diff](4fe7d150eb..4ba1d0b553)
Tree-SHA512: 3729bdf7f25d04e232f173ccee04ddbb2afdaafa3d04292a01cecf58fb11b3b2bc133e8490277f1a67622b62d17929c242dc980f9bb647896beea4332ee35306
This helper class is an alternative to CMedianFilter, but without a
lot of the special logic and exceptions that we needed while it was
still used for consensus.
a8203e94123b6ea6e4f4a6320e3ad20457f44a28 refactor: Simplify `extra_txn` to be a vec of CTransactionRef instead of a vec of pair<Wtxid, CTransactionRef> (AngusP)
c3c18433ae1d5b024d4cb92c762f5ca0ec7849c8 refactor: Use typesafe Wtxid in compact block encoding message, instead of ambiguous uint256. (AngusP)
Pull request description:
The first commit replaces `uint256` with typesafe `Wtxid` (or `Txid`) types introduced in #28107.
The second commit then simplifies the extra tx `vector` to just be of `CTransactionRef`s instead of a `std::pair<Wtxid, CTransactionRef>`, as it's easy to get a `Wtxid` from a transaction ref.
ACKs for top commit:
glozow:
ACK a8203e94123b6ea6e4f4a6320e3ad20457f44a28
dergoegge:
ACK a8203e94123b6ea6e4f4a6320e3ad20457f44a28
Tree-SHA512: b4ba1423a8059f9fc118782bd8a668213d229c822f22b01267de74d6ea97fe4f2aad46b5da7c0178ecc9905293e9a0eafba1d75330297c055e27fd53c8c8ebfd
All `CTransactionRef` have `.GetWitnessHash()` that returns a cached `const Wtxid` (since fac1223a568fa1ad6dd602350598eed278d115e8),
so we don't need to pass transaction refs around with their IDs as they're easy to get from a ref.
80f8b92f4f2311b9e9a25361c9dd973244e6f95c remove libbitcoinconsensus (fanquake)
Pull request description:
This was deprecated in `v27.0`, for removal in `v28.0`. See discussion in PR #29189.
ACKs for top commit:
theuni:
Concept ACK and light review ACK 80f8b92f4f2311b9e9a25361c9dd973244e6f95c. My only hesitation here is that (afaics?) there's now nothing keeping undesired features like threading or globals from working their way into the interpreter in future commits.
m3dwards:
Concept ACK 80f8b92f4f
TheCharlatan:
ACK 80f8b92f4f2311b9e9a25361c9dd973244e6f95c
hebasto:
ACK 80f8b92f4f2311b9e9a25361c9dd973244e6f95c, I have reviewed the code and it looks OK.
Tree-SHA512: 17a62118aeb088f2695c892bb32794dfea3061e3cb7d9e8e9f1c06c3ff6f63a7587fa532e37edbb91fbc5a19b12c9a0f8e05fa9e8864aa07f92665375d847e80
72959867784098137a50c34f86deca8235eef4f8 Unit tests for CalculateFeerateDiagramsForRBF (Greg Sanders)
b767e6bd47cb0fb8f7aea3fb10c597e59a35bf74 test: unit test for ImprovesFeerateDiagram (Greg Sanders)
7e89b659e1ddd0c04fa2bddba9706b5d1a1daec3 Add fuzz test for FeeFrac (Greg Sanders)
4d6528a3d6bf3821c216c68f99170e2faab5d63c fuzz: fuzz diagram creation and comparison (Greg Sanders)
e9c5aeb11d641b8cae373452339760809625021d test: Add tests for CompareFeerateDiagram and CheckConflictTopology (Greg Sanders)
588a98dccc5dbb6e331f28d83a4a10a13d70eb31 fuzz: Add fuzz target for ImprovesFeerateDiagram (Greg Sanders)
2079b80854e2595f6f696e7c13a56c7f2a7da9f4 Implement ImprovesFeerateDiagram (Greg Sanders)
66d966dcfaad3638f84654e710f403cb0a0a2ac7 Add FeeFrac unit tests (Greg Sanders)
ce8e22542ed0b4fa5794d3203207146418d59473 Add FeeFrac utils (Greg Sanders)
Pull request description:
This is a smaller piece of https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28984 broken off for easier review.
Up to date explanation of diagram checks are here: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/mempool-incentive-compatibility/553
This infrastructure has two near term applications prior to cluster mempool:
1) Limited Package RBF(https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/28984): We want to allow package RBF only when we know it improves the mempool. This narrowly scoped functionality allows use with v3-like topologies, and will be expanded at some point post-cluster mempool when diagram checks can be done efficiently against bounded cluster sizes.
2) Replacement for single tx RBF(in a cluster size of up to two) against conflicts of up to cluster size two. `ImprovesFeerateDiagram` interface will have to change for this use-case, which is a future direction to solve certain pins and improve mempool incentive compatibility: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/ephemeral-anchors-and-mev/383#diagram-checks-fix-this-3
And longer-term, this would be the proposed way we would compute incentive compatibility for all conflicts, post-cluster mempool.
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
utACK 72959867784098137a50c34f86deca8235eef4f8
glozow:
code review ACK 72959867784098137a50c34f86deca8235eef4f8
murchandamus:
utACK 72959867784098137a50c34f86deca8235eef4f8
ismaelsadeeq:
Re-ACK 7295986778
willcl-ark:
crACK 72959867784098137a50c34f86deca8235eef4f8
sdaftuar:
ACK 72959867784098137a50c34f86deca8235eef4f8
Tree-SHA512: 79593e5a087801c06f06cc8b73aa3e7b96ab938d3b90f5d229c4e4bfca887a77b447605c49aa5eb7ddcead85706c534ac5eb6146ae2396af678f4beaaa5bea8e
626f8e398e219b84907ccaad036f69177d39284c fuzz: actually test garbage >64b in p2p transport test (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
This fixes an oversight from #28196: in the `p2p_transport_bidirectional_v2` fuzz test, when the desired garbage length is over 64 bytes, the code would actually use garbage length 0. Fix this.
ACKs for top commit:
instagibbs:
ACK 626f8e398e
brunoerg:
crACK 626f8e398e219b84907ccaad036f69177d39284c
Tree-SHA512: f6346367adb10464b6c9d20aef43625531d2a4d8110887ad03214b8c1907b83560f2dd5b5415e2180a40b4cd276d51881b32b60c740471b5c6bb218aa19848d8
38f70ba6ac86fb96c60571d2e1f316315c1c73cc RPC: Add maxfeerate and maxburnamount args to submitpackage (Greg Sanders)
Pull request description:
Resolves https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/28949
I couldn't manage to do it very cleanly outside of (sub)package evaluation itself, since it would change the current interface very heavily. Instead I threaded through the max fee argument and used that directly via ATMPArgs. From that perspective, this is somewhat a reversion from https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19339. In a post-cluster mempool world, these checks could be consolidated to right after the given (ancestor) package is linearized/chunked, by just checking the feerate of the top chunk and rejecting the submission entirely if the top chunk is too high.
The implication here is that subpackages can be submitted to the mempool prior to hitting this new fee-based error condition.
ACKs for top commit:
ismaelsadeeq:
Re-ACK 38f70ba6ac👍🏾
glozow:
ACK 38f70ba6ac with some non-blocking nits
murchandamus:
LGTM, code review ACK 38f70ba6ac86fb96c60571d2e1f316315c1c73cc
Tree-SHA512: 38212aa9de25730944cee58b0806a3d37097e42719af8dd7de91ce86bb5d9770b6f7c37354bf418bd8ba571c52947da1dcdbb968bf429dd1dbdf8715315af18f
And thread the feerate value through ProcessNewPackage to
reject individual transactions that exceed the given
feerate. This allows subpackage processing, and is
compatible with future package RBF work.
567cec9a05e1261e955535f734826b12341684b6 doc: add release notes and help text for unix sockets (Matthew Zipkin)
bfe51928911daf484ae07deb52a7ff0bcb2526ae test: cover UNIX sockets in feature_proxy.py (Matthew Zipkin)
c65c0d01630b44fa71321ea7ad68d5f9fbb7aefb init: allow UNIX socket path for -proxy and -onion (Matthew Zipkin)
c3bd43142eba77dcf1acd4984e437759f65e237a gui: accomodate unix socket Proxy in updateDefaultProxyNets() (Matthew Zipkin)
a88bf9dedd1d8c1db0a9c8b663dab3e3c2f0f030 i2p: construct Session with Proxy instead of CService (Matthew Zipkin)
d9318a37ec09fe0b002815a7e48710e530620ae2 net: split ConnectToSocket() from ConnectDirectly() for unix sockets (Matthew Zipkin)
ac2ecf3182fb5ad9bcd41540b19382376114d6ee proxy: rename randomize_credentials to m_randomize_credentials (Matthew Zipkin)
a89c3f59dc44eaf4f59912c1accfc0ce5d61933a netbase: extend Proxy class to wrap UNIX socket as well as TCP (Matthew Zipkin)
3a7d6548effa6cd9a4a5413b690c2fd85da4ef65 net: move CreateSock() calls from ConnectNode() to netbase methods (Matthew Zipkin)
74f568cb6fd5c74b7b9bf0ce69876430746a53b1 netbase: allow CreateSock() to create UNIX sockets if supported (Matthew Zipkin)
bae86c8d318d06818aa75a9ebe3db864197f0bc6 netbase: refactor CreateSock() to accept sa_family_t (Matthew Zipkin)
adb3a3e51de205cc69b1a58647c65c04fa6c6362 configure: test for unix domain sockets (Matthew Zipkin)
Pull request description:
Closes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/27252
UNIX domain sockets are a mechanism for inter-process communication that are faster than local TCP ports (because there is no need for TCP overhead) and potentially more secure because access is managed by the filesystem instead of serving an open port on the system.
There has been work on [unix domain sockets before](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/9979) but for now I just wanted to start on this single use-case which is enabling unix sockets from the client side, specifically connecting to a local Tor proxy (Tor can listen on unix sockets and even enforces strict curent-user-only access permission before binding) configured by `-onion=` or `-proxy=`
I copied the prefix `unix:` usage from Tor. With this patch built locally you can test with your own filesystem path (example):
`tor --SocksPort unix:/Users/matthewzipkin/torsocket/x`
`bitcoind -proxy=unix:/Users/matthewzipkin/torsocket/x`
Prep work for this feature includes:
- Moving where and how we create `sockaddr` and `Sock` to accommodate `AF_UNIX` without disturbing `CService`
- Expanding `Proxy` class to represent either a `CService` or a UNIX socket (by its file path)
Future work:
- Enable UNIX sockets for ZMQ (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27679)
- Enable UNIX sockets for I2P SAM proxy (some code is included in this PR but not tested or exposed to user options yet)
- Enable UNIX sockets on windows where supported
- Update Network Proxies dialog in GUI to support UNIX sockets
ACKs for top commit:
Sjors:
re-ACK 567cec9a05e1261e955535f734826b12341684b6
tdb3:
re ACK for 567cec9a05e1261e955535f734826b12341684b6.
achow101:
ACK 567cec9a05e1261e955535f734826b12341684b6
vasild:
ACK 567cec9a05e1261e955535f734826b12341684b6
Tree-SHA512: de81860e56d5de83217a18df4c35297732b4ad491e293a0153d2d02a0bde1d022700a1131279b187ef219651487537354b9d06d10fde56225500c7e257df92c1
0a533613fb44207053796fd01a9f4b523a3153d4 docs: add release notes for #27114 (brunoerg)
e6b8f19de9a6d1c477d0bbda18d17794cd81a6f4 test: add coverage for whitelisting manual connections (brunoerg)
c985eb854cc86deb747caea5283c17cf51b6a983 test: add option to speed up tx relay/mempool sync (brunoerg)
66bc6e2d1749f43d7b314aa2784a06af78440170 Accept "in" and "out" flags to -whitelist to allow whitelisting manual connections (Luke Dashjr)
8e06be347c5e14cbe75256eba170e0867f95f360 net_processing: Move extra service flag into InitializeNode (Luke Dashjr)
9133fd69a5cc9a0ab1a06a60d09f1b7e1039018e net: Move `NetPermissionFlags::Implicit` verification to `AddWhitelistPermissionFlags` (Luke Dashjr)
2863d7dddb62d987b3e1c3b8bfad7083f0f774b2 net: store `-whitelist{force}relay` values in `CConnman` (brunoerg)
Pull request description:
Revives #17167. It allows whitelisting manual connections. Fixes#9923
Since there are some PRs/issues around this topic, I'll list some motivations/comments for whitelisting outbound connections from them:
- Speed-up tx relay/mempool sync for testing purposes (my personal motivation for this) - In #26970, theStack pointed out that we whitelist peers to speed up tx relay for fast mempool synchronization, however, since it applies only for inbound connections and considering the topology `node0 <--- node1 <---- node2 <--- ... <-- nodeN`, if a tx is submitted from any node other than node0, the mempool synchronization can take quite long.
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29058#issuecomment-1865155764 - "Before enabling -v2transport by default (which I'd image may happen after https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/24748) we could consider a way to force manual connections to be only-v1 or even only-v2 (disabling reconnect-with-v1). A possibility could be through a net permission flag, if https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/27114 makes it in."
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/17167#issuecomment-1168606032 - "This would allow us to use https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/25355 when making outgoing connections to all nodes, except to whitelisted ones for which we would use our persistent I2P address."
- Force-relay/mempool permissions for a node you intentionally connected to.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 0a533613fb44207053796fd01a9f4b523a3153d4
sr-gi:
re-ACK [0a53361](0a533613fb)
pinheadmz:
ACK 0a533613fb44207053796fd01a9f4b523a3153d4
Tree-SHA512: 97a79bb854110da04540897d2619eda409d829016aafdf1825ab5515334b0b42ef82f33cd41587af235b3af6ddcec3f2905ca038b5ab22e4c8a03d34f27aebe1
