ba84a25deec0b3b9b94ee51b373e715fec995791 [doc] update mempool-replacements.md for incremental relay feerate change (glozow)
18720bc5d5b4d3acf91060859180d72cbfdf59b7 [doc] release note for min feerate changes (glozow)
6da5de58cabc4133c379baa50845e30e5bc6b3e4 [policy] lower default minrelaytxfee and incrementalrelayfee to 100sat/kvB (glozow)
2e515d2897eaa5a9b012eb78aef105e1cf80d42b [prep/test] make wallet_fundrawtransaction's minrelaytxfee assumption explicit (glozow)
457cfb61b5323a13218b3cfb5a6a6d8b3a7c5f7f [prep/util] help MockMempoolMinFee handle more precise feerates (glozow)
3eab8b724044dc321f70e5eed66b149713158a04 [prep/test] replace magic number 1000 with respective feerate vars (glozow)
5f2df0ef78be7b24798d0983c9b962740608f1f4 [miner] lower default -blockmintxfee to 1sat/kvB (glozow)
d6213d6aa114aeed6804a585491d741386fd2739 [doc] assert that default min relay feerate and incremental are the same (glozow)
1fbee5d7b61b83e68e4230c8a97ca308de92c4c3 [test] explicitly check default -minrelaytxfee and -incrementalrelayfee (glozow)
72dc18467dbfc16cdbda2dd109b087243b397799 [test] RBF rule 4 for various incrementalrelayfee settings (glozow)
85f498893f54ea7d84f2bdf12aa35d198edf8a72 [test] check bypass of minrelay for various minrelaytxfee settings (glozow)
e5f896bb1f052fb8c7811c6024cb49143b427512 [test] check miner doesn't select 0fee transactions (glozow)
Pull request description:
ML post for discussion about the general concept, how this impacts the wider ecosystem, philosophy about minimum feerates, etc: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/changing-the-minimum-relay-feerate/1886
This PR is inspired by #13922 and #32959 to lower the minimum relay feerate in response to bitcoin's exchange rate changes in the last ~10 years. It lowers the default `-minrelaytxfee` and `-incrementalrelayfee`, and knocks `-blockmintxfee` down to the minimum nonzero setting. Also adds some tests for the settings and pulls in #32750.
The minimum relay feerate is a DoS protection rule, representing a price on the network bandwidth used to relay transactions that have no PoW. While relay nodes don't all collect fees, the assumption is that if nodes on the network use their resources to relay this transaction, it will reach a miner and the attacker's money will be spent once it is mined. The incremental relay feerate is similar: it's used to price the relay of replacement transactions (the additional fees need to cover the new transactions at this feerate) and evicted transactions (following a trim, the new mempool minimum feerate is the package feerate of what was removed + incremental).
Also note that many nodes on the network have elected to relay/mine lower feerate transactions. Miners (some say up to 85%) are choosing to mine these low feerate transactions instead of leaving block space unfilled, but these blocks have extremely poor compact block reconstruction rates with nodes that rejected or didn't hear about those transactions earlier.
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33106#issuecomment-3155627414
- https://x.com/caesrcd/status/1947022514267230302
- https://mempool.space/block/00000000000000000001305770e0aa279dcd8ba8be18c3d5cf736a26f77e06fd
- https://mempool.space/block/00000000000000000001b491649ec030aa8e003e1f4f9d3b24bb99ba16f91e97
- https://x.com/mononautical/status/1949452586391855121
While it wouldn't make sense to loosen DoS restrictions recklessly in response to these events, I think the current price is higher than necessary, and this motivates us changing the default soon. Since the minimum relay feerate defines an amount as too small based on what it costs the attacker, it makes sense to consider BTC's conversion rate to what resources you can buy in the "real world."
Going off of [this comment](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32959#issuecomment-3095260286) and [this comment](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33106#issuecomment-3142444090)
- Let's say an attacker wants to use/exhaust the network's bandwidth, and has the choice between renting resources from a commercial provider and getting the network to "spam" itself it by sending unconfirmed transactions. We'd like the latter to be more expensive than the former.
- The bandwidth for relaying a transaction across the network is roughly its serialized size (plus relay overhead) x number of nodes. A 1000vB transaction is 1000-4000B serialized. With 100k nodes, that's 0.1-0.4GB
- If the going rate for ec2 bandwidth is 10c/GB, that's like 1-4c per kvB of transaction data
- Then a 1000vB transaction should pay at least 4c
- $0.04 USD is 40 satoshis at 100k USD/BTC
- Baking in some margin for changes in USD/BTC conversion rate, number of nodes (and thus bandwidth), and commercial service costs, I think 50-100 satoshis is on the conservative end but in the right ballpark
- At least 97% of the recent sub-1sat/vB transactions would be accepted with a new threshold of 0.1sat/vB: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33106#issuecomment-3156213089
List of feerates that are changed and why:
- min relay feerate: significant conversion rate changes, see above
- incremental relay feerate: should follow min relay feerate, see above
- block minimum feerate: shouldn’t be above min relay feerate, otherwise the node accepts transactions it will never mine. I've knocked it down to the bare minimum of 1sat/kvB. Now that we no longer have coin age priority (removed in v0.15), I think we can leave it to the `CheckFeeRate` policy rule to enforce a minimum entry price, and the block assembly code should just fill up the block with whatever it finds in mempool.
List of feerates that are not changed and why:
- dust feerate: this feerate cannot be changed as flexibly as the minrelay feerate. A much longer record of low feerate transactions being mined is needed to motivate a decrease there.
- maxfeerate (RPC, wallet): I think the conversion rate is relevant as well, but out of scope for this PR
- minimum feerate returned by fee estimator: should be done later. In the past, we've excluded new policy defaults from fee estimation until we feel confident they represent miner policy (e.g. #9519). Also, the fee estimator itself doesn't have support for sub-1sat/vB yet.
- all wallet feerates (mintxfee, fallbackfee, discardfee, consolidatefeerate, WALLET_INCREMENTAL_RELAY_FEE, etc.): should be done later. Our standard procedure is to do wallet changes at least 1 release after policy changes.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK ba84a25deec0b3b9b94ee51b373e715fec995791
gmaxwell:
ACK ba84a25deec0b3b9b94ee51b373e715fec995791
jsarenik:
Tested ACK ba84a25deec0b3b9b94ee51b373e715fec995791
darosior:
ACK ba84a25deec0b3b9b94ee51b373e715fec995791
ajtowns:
ACK ba84a25deec0b3b9b94ee51b373e715fec995791
davidgumberg:
crACK ba84a25dee
w0xlt:
ACK ba84a25dee
caesrcd:
reACK ba84a25deec0b3b9b94ee51b373e715fec995791
ismaelsadeeq:
re-ACK ba84a25deec0b3b9b94ee51b373e715fec995791
Tree-SHA512: b4c35e8b506b1184db466551a7e2e48bb1e535972a8dbcaa145ce3a8bfdcc70a8807dc129460f129a9d31024174d34077154a387c32f1a3e6831f6fa5e9c399e
2b00030af84efd50cfc60125db4ae49da6b7aa9a interfaces, chain, refactor: Remove inaccurate getActiveChainLocator (pablomartin4btc)
110a0f405cd696ebfd6edce07c1b347723e84a0f interfaces, chain, refactor: Remove unused getTipLocator (pablomartin4btc)
Pull request description:
Remove `Chain::getTipLocator`, `Chain::GetLocator()`, and `Chain::getActiveChainLocator`:
- `Chain::getTipLocator` is no longer used.
- `Chain::GetLocator`, replaced its call by `GetLocator()`, which uses `LocatorEntries`, avoiding direct access to the chain itself (change suggested by l0rinc while reviewing this PR to maintain consistency with the overall refactoring).
- `Chain::getActiveChainLocator`, whose name was misleading, has functionality redundant with Chain::findBlock.
- Additionally, the comment for getActiveChainLocator became inaccurate following changes in commit ed470940cd (from PR #25717).
This is a [follow-up](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29652#issuecomment-3151665095) to #29652.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 2b00030af84efd50cfc60125db4ae49da6b7aa9a
furszy:
ACK 2b00030af84efd50cfc60125db4ae49da6b7aa9a
stickies-v:
ACK 2b00030af84efd50cfc60125db4ae49da6b7aa9a
w0xlt:
ACK 2b00030af8
Tree-SHA512: b12ba6a15feeaeec692d69204a6e155e3af43edfac25597dabf14cacca1e4a2152574816e58dc544f39043c5721f5e707acf544f4541d3b9c0f8c0c40069215e
The getActiveChainLocator method name was misleading, and its functionality
duplicated `Chain::findBlock`. This commit removes the method and replaces
all its usages with direct `Chain::findBlock` calls.
Additionally, the comment of getActiveChainLocator has been outdated since
commit ed47094 from #25717.
Finally, in CWallet::ScanForWalletTransactions, the findBlock calls are now
unified into a single call at the start of the function.
Co-authored-by: Ryan Ofsky <ryan@ofsky.org>
Co-authored-by: Matias Furszyfer <mfurszy@protonmail.com>
Also removed CChain::GetLocator() and replaced its call
with GetLocator() which uses LocatorEntries instead.
Co-authored-by: ryanofsky <ryan@ofsky.org>
Co-authored-by: l0rinc <l0rinc@users.noreply.github.com>
These remaining miscellaneous changes were identified by commenting out
the `operator const uint256&` conversion and the `Compare(const uint256&)`
method from `transaction_identifier.h`.
c0642e558a02319ade33dc1014e7ae981663ea46 [fuzz] fix latency score check in txorphan_protected (glozow)
3d4d4f0d92d42809e74377e4380abdc70f74de5d scripted-diff: rename "ann" variables to "latency_score" (monlovesmango)
3b924489238220710326e9031c7aaa0d606c9064 [doc] comment fixups for orphanage changes (glozow)
1384dbaf6d0bfcdb05f97e1e3cb3d5e498bee505 [config] emit warning for -maxorphantx, but allow it to be set (glozow)
b10c55b298d4d2b7dddfecdbeb0edc624b8e6eb2 fix up TxOrphanage lower_bound sanity checks (glozow)
cfd71c67043a2a46950fd3f055afbe4a93922f75 scripted-diff: rename TxOrphanage outpoints index (glozow)
edb97bb3f151600f00c94a2732d2595446011295 [logging] add logs for inner loop of LimitOrphans (glozow)
8a58d0e87d70580ae47da228e2f88cd53c40c675 scripted-diff: rename OrphanTxBase to OrphanInfo (glozow)
cc50f2f0df6e6e2cc9b9aeb3c3c8e1c78fa5be1d [cleanup] replace TxOrphanage::Size() with CountUniqueOrphans (glozow)
ed24e016969098c486f413f4f57dcffe35241785 [optimization] Maintain at most 1 reconsiderable announcement per wtxid (Pieter Wuille)
af7402ccfa7f19177b5f422f596a3ab2bd1e9633 [refactor] make TxOrphanage keep itself trimmed (glozow)
d1fac25ff3c3ac090b68e370efc6dd9374b6ad3b [doc] 31829 release note (glozow)
Pull request description:
Followup to #31829:
- Release notes
- Have the orphanage auto-trim itself whenever necessary (and test changes) https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/31829#discussion_r2169508690
- Reduce duplicate reconsiderations by keeping track of which txns are already reconsiderable so we only mark it for reconsideration for 1 peer at a time https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/31829#issuecomment-3001627814
- Rename `OrphanTxBase` to `OrphanInfo`
- Get rid of `Size()` method by replacing all calls with `CountUniqueOrphans`
- Rename outpoints index since they point to wtxids, not iterators https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/31829#discussion_r2205557613
- Add more logging in the `LimitOrphans` inner loop to make it easy to see which peers are being trimmed https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/31829#issuecomment-3074385460
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
utACK c0642e558a02319ade33dc1014e7ae981663ea46
marcofleon:
Nice, ACK c0642e558a02319ade33dc1014e7ae981663ea46
Tree-SHA512: f298eae92cf906ed5e4f15a24eeffa7b9e620bcff457772cd77522dd9f0b3b183ffc976871b1b0e6fe93009e64877d518e53d4b9e186e0df58fc16d17f6de90a
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i 's/max_global_ann/max_global_latency_score/g' src/node/txorphanage.cpp
sed -i 's/max_global_ann/max_global_latency_score/g' src/node/txorphanage.h
sed -i 's/max_global_ann/max_global_latency_score/g' src/test/orphanage_tests.cpp
sed -i 's/max_global_ann/max_global_latency_score/g' src/test/fuzz/txorphan.cpp
sed -i 's/max_global_ann/max_global_latency_score/g' src/bench/txorphanage.cpp
sed -i 's/max_ann/max_lat/g' src/node/txorphanage.cpp
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
This introduces an invariant that TxOrphanageImpl never holds more than one
announcement with m_reconsider=true for a given wtxid. This avoids duplicate
work, both in the caller might otherwise reconsider the same transaction multiple
times before it is ready, and internally in AddChildrenToWorkSet, which might
otherwise iterate over all announcements multiple times.
It is redundant with -logsourcelocations and the log messages are
clearer without it.
Also, remove a double-space.
Also, add braces around `if` touched in the next commit.
This tiny behavior change requires a test fixup.
249889bee6b88eb9814eb969e6fb108f86a4bf98 orphanage: avoid vtx iteration when no orphans (furszy)
41ad2be4340d7b18a4669aa9becef8936597f000 mempool: Avoid expensive loop in `removeForBlock` during IBD (Lőrinc)
Pull request description:
During Initial Block Download, the mempool is usually empty, but `CTxMemPool::removeForBlock` is still called for every connected block where we:
* iterate over every transaction in the block even though none will be found in the empty `mapTx`, always leaving `txs_removed_for_block` empty...
* which is pre-allocated regardless with `40 bytes * vtx.size()`, even though it will always remain empty.
Similarly to https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32730#discussion_r2140691354, this change introduces a minor performance & memory optimization by only executing the loop if any of the affected mempool maps have any contents. The second commit is cherry-picked from there since it's related to this change as well.
ACKs for top commit:
optout21:
ACK 249889bee6b88eb9814eb969e6fb108f86a4bf98
glozow:
ACK 249889bee6b88eb9814eb969e6fb108f86a4bf98
ismaelsadeeq:
reACK 249889bee6b88eb9814eb969e6fb108f86a4bf98
Tree-SHA512: 80d06ff1515164529cdc3ad21db3041bb5b2a1d4b72ba9e6884cdf40c5f1477fee7479944b8bca32a6f0bf27c4e5501fccd085f6041a2dbb101438629cfb9e4b
Mechanical refactor of the low-level "xor" wording to signal the intent instead of the implementation used.
The renames are ordered by heaviest-hitting substitutions first, and were constructed such that after each replacement the code is still compilable.
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
sed -i \
-e 's/\bGetObfuscateKey\b/GetObfuscation/g' \
-e 's/\bxor_key\b/obfuscation/g' \
-e 's/\bxor_pat\b/obfuscation/g' \
-e 's/\bm_xor_key\b/m_obfuscation/g' \
-e 's/\bm_xor\b/m_obfuscation/g' \
-e 's/\bobfuscate_key\b/m_obfuscation/g' \
-e 's/\bOBFUSCATE_KEY_KEY\b/OBFUSCATION_KEY_KEY/g' \
-e 's/\bSetXor(/SetObfuscation(/g' \
-e 's/\bdata_xor\b/obfuscation/g' \
-e 's/\bCreateObfuscateKey\b/CreateObfuscation/g' \
-e 's/\bobfuscate key\b/obfuscation key/g' \
$(git ls-files '*.cpp' '*.h')
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
Since 31 byte xor-keys are not used in the codebase, using the common size (8 bytes) makes the benchmarks more realistic.
Co-authored-by: maflcko <6399679+maflcko@users.noreply.github.com>
This is preparation for the simulation fuzz test added in a later commit. Since
AddChildrenToWorkSet consumes randomness, there is no way for the simulator to
exactly predict its behavior. By returning the set of made-reconsiderable announcements
instead, the simulator can instead test that it is *a* valid choice, and then
apply it to its own data structures.
For the default number of peers (125), allows each to relay a default
descendant package (up to 25-1=24 can be missing inputs) of small (9
inputs or fewer) transactions out of order.
This limit also gives acceptable bounds for worst case LimitOrphans iterations.
Functional tests aren't changed to check for larger cap because it would
make the runtime too long.
Also deletes the now-unused DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS.
This is largely a reimplementation using boost::multi_index_container.
All the same public methods are available. It has an index by outpoint,
per-peer tracking, peer worksets, etc.
A few differences:
- Limits have changed: instead of a global limit of 100 unique orphans,
we have a maximum number of announcements (which can include duplicate
orphans) and a global memory limit which scales with the number of
peers.
- The maximum announcements limit is 100 to match the original limit,
but this is actually a stricter limit because the announcement count
is not de-duplicated.
- Eviction strategy: when global limits are reached, a per-peer limit
comes into play. While limits are exceeded, we choose the peer whose
“DoS score” (max usage / limit ratio for announcements and memory
limits) is highest and evict announcements by entry time, sorting
non-reconsiderable ones before reconsiderable ones. Since announcements
are unique by (wtxid, peer), as long as 1 announcement remains for a
transaction, it remains in the orphanage.
- This eviction strategy means no peer can influence the eviction of
another peer’s orphans.
- Also, since global limits are a multiple of per-peer limits, as long
as a peer does not exceed its limits, its orphans are protected from
eviction.
- Orphans no longer expire, since older announcements are generally
removed before newer ones.
- GetChildrenFromSamePeer returns the transactions from newest to
oldest.
Co-authored-by: Pieter Wuille <pieter@wuille.net>
Move towards a model where TxOrphanage is initialized with limits that
it remembers throughout its lifetime.
Remove the param. Limiting by number of unique orphans will be removed
in a later commit.
Now that -maxorphantx is gone, this does not change the node behavior.
The parameter is only used in tests.
Expiry is going away in a later commit.
This is only an RPC change. Behavior of the orphanage does not change.
Note that getorphantxs is marked experimental.
a60f863d3e276534444571282f432b913d3967db scripted-diff: Replace GenTxidVariant with GenTxid (marcofleon)
c8ba1995986323cd9e76097acc1f15eed7c60943 Remove old GenTxid class (marcofleon)
072a198ea4bc9f1e8449cd31e55d397b75ce4ad5 Convert remaining instances of GenTxid to GenTxidVariant (marcofleon)
1b528391c79497ae19f7e481439e350533c7cd1a Convert `txrequest` to GenTxidVariant (marcofleon)
bde4579b0780aa3754af35beffbcfeb31f28045b Convert `txdownloadman_impl` to GenTxidVariant (marcofleon)
c876a892ec0b04851bea0a688d7681b6aaca4cb7 Replace GenTxid with Txid/Wtxid overloads in `txmempool` (marcofleon)
de858ce2bea83c53635dee9a49c8c273a12440dd move-only: make GetInfo a private CTxMemPool member (stickies-v)
eee473d9f3019a0ea4ebbc9c41781813ad574a86 Convert `CompareInvMempoolOrder` to GenTxidVariant (marcofleon)
243553d59071f3e43a42f3809706790495b17ffc refactor: replace get_iter_from_wtxid with GetIter(const Wtxid&) (stickies-v)
fcf92fd640eae60d1f601136a4e1c9de8ccb68b5 refactor: make CTxMemPool::GetIter strongly typed (marcofleon)
11d28f21bb8f0c3094934b3fef45871f73bb216a Implement GenTxid as a variant (marcofleon)
Pull request description:
Part of the [type safety refactor](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32189).
This PR changes the GenTxid class to a variant, which holds both Txids and Wtxids. This provides compile-time type safety and eliminates the manual type check (bool m_is_wtxid). Variables that can be either a Txid or a Wtxid are now using the new GenTxid variant, instead of uint256.
ACKs for top commit:
w0xlt:
ACK a60f863d3e
dergoegge:
Code review ACK a60f863d3e276534444571282f432b913d3967db
maflcko:
review ACK a60f863d3e276534444571282f432b913d3967db 🎽
theStack:
Code-review ACK a60f863d3e276534444571282f432b913d3967db
Tree-SHA512: da9b73b7bdffee2eb9281a409205519ac330d3336094d17681896703fbca8099608782c9c85801e388e4d90af5af8abf1f34931f57bbbe6e9674d802d6066047
Now that we are storing `CTxMemPool::CompareDepthAndScore` parameters using
`std::variant` we have no portable zero-overhead way of accessing them,
so use `std::visit` and drop `bool wtxid` in-parameter.
Co-authored-by: stickies-v <stickies-v@protonmail.com>
fcfd3db563e89fd79820a4cdfa102d624d801de1 remove RPCTimerInterface and RPCRunLater (Matthew Zipkin)
8a1765795fd3bff79d790102ca7cefa8fd9b204c use WalletContext scheduler for walletpassphrase callback (Matthew Zipkin)
Pull request description:
This removes the dependency on libevent for events scheduled by RPC commands, like re-locking a wallet some time after decryption with walletpassphrase. Since walletpassphrase is currently the only RPC that does this, `RPCRunLater`, `RPCTimerInterface` and all related methods are left unused, and deleted in the second commit. Any future RPC that needs to execute a callback in the future can follow the pattern in this PR and just use a scheduler from node or wallet context.
This is an alternative approach to #32796, described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32796#issuecomment-3014309449
ACKs for top commit:
fjahr:
Code Review ACK fcfd3db563e89fd79820a4cdfa102d624d801de1
achow101:
ACK fcfd3db563e89fd79820a4cdfa102d624d801de1
furszy:
ACK fcfd3db563e89fd79820a4cdfa102d624d801de1
Tree-SHA512: 04f5e9c3f73f598c3d41d6e35bb59c64c7b93b03ad9fce3c40901733147ce7764f41f475fef1527d44af18f722759996a31ca83b48cb52153795d5022fecfd14
c10e382d2a3b76b70ebb8a4eb5cd99fc9f14d702 flatfile: check whether the file has been closed successfully (Vasil Dimov)
4bb5dd78ea4b578922a3316b37b486f96cb0beec util: check that a file has been closed before ~AutoFile() is called (Vasil Dimov)
8bb34f07df9ad45faf25c32c99a4dd70759b25be Explicitly close all AutoFiles that have been written (Vasil Dimov)
a69c4098b273b6db5d2212ba91cfc713c1634c5d rpc: take ownership of the file by WriteUTXOSnapshot() (Hodlinator)
Pull request description:
`fclose(3)` may fail to flush the previously written data to disk, thus a failing `fclose(3)` is as serious as a failing `fwrite(3)`.
Previously the code ignored `fclose(3)` failures. This PR improves that by changing all users of `AutoFile` that use it to write data to explicitly close the file and handle a possible error.
---
Other alternatives are:
1. `fflush(3)` after each write to the file (and throw if it fails from the `AutoFile::write()` method) and hope that `fclose(3)` will then always succeed. Assert that it succeeds from the destructor 🙄. Will hurt performance.
2. Throw nevertheless from the destructor. Exception within the exception in C++ I think results in terminating the program without a useful message.
3. (this is implemented in the latest incarnation of this PR) Redesign `AutoFile` so that its destructor cannot fail. Adjust _all_ its users 😭. For example, if the file has been written to, then require the callers to explicitly call the `AutoFile::fclose()` method before the object goes out of scope. In the destructor, as a sanity check, assume/assert that this is indeed the case. Defeats the purpose of a RAII wrapper for `FILE*` which automatically closes the file when it goes out of scope and there are a lot of users of `AutoFile`.
4. Pass a new callback function to the `AutoFile` constructor which will be called from the destructor to handle `fclose()` errors, as described in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/29307#issuecomment-2243842400. My thinking is that if that callback is going to only log a message, then we can log the message directly from the destructor without needing a callback. If the callback is going to do more complicated error handling then it is easier to do that at the call site by directly calling `AutoFile::fclose()` instead of getting the `AutoFile` object out of scope (so that its destructor is called) and inspecting for side effects done by the callback (e.g. set a variable to indicate a failed `fclose()`).
ACKs for top commit:
l0rinc:
ACK c10e382d2a3b76b70ebb8a4eb5cd99fc9f14d702
achow101:
ACK c10e382d2a3b76b70ebb8a4eb5cd99fc9f14d702
hodlinator:
re-ACK c10e382d2a3b76b70ebb8a4eb5cd99fc9f14d702
Tree-SHA512: 3994ca57e5b2b649fc84f24dad144173b7500fc0e914e06291d5c32fbbf8d2b1f8eae0040abd7a5f16095ddf4e11fe1636c6092f49058cda34f3eb2ee536d7ba
9341b5333ad54ccdb7c16802ff06c51b956948e7 blockstorage: make block read hash checks explicit (Lőrinc)
2371b9f4ee0b108ebbb8afedc47d73ce0f97d272 test/bench: verify hash in `ComputeFilter` reads (Lőrinc)
5d235d50d6dd0cc23175a1484e8ebb6cdc6e2183 net: assert block hash in `ProcessGetBlockData` and `ProcessMessage` (Lőrinc)
Pull request description:
A follow-up to https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32487#discussion_r2094072165, after which validating the hash of a read block from disk doesn't incur the cost of calculating its hash anymore.
### Summary
This PR adds explicit checks that the read block header's hash matches the one we were expecting.
### Context
After the previous PR, validating a block's hash during read operations became essentially free. This PR leverages that by requiring callers to provide a block's expected hash (or `std::nullopt`), preventing silent failures caused by corrupted or mismatched data. Most `ReadBlock` usages were updated with expected hashes and now fail on mismatch.
### Changes
* added hash assertions in `ProcessGetBlockData` and `ProcessMessage` to validate that the block read from disk matches the expected hash;
* updated tests and benchmark to pass the correct block hash to `ReadBlock()`, ensuring the hash validation is tested - or none if we already expect PoW failure;
* removed the default value for `expected_hash`, requiring an explicit hash for all block reads.
### Why is the hash still optional (but no longer has a default value)
* for header-error tests, where the goal is to trigger failures early in the parsing process;
* for out-of-order orphan blocks, where the child hash isn't available before the initial disk read.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
review ACK 9341b5333ad54ccdb7c16802ff06c51b956948e7 🕙
achow101:
ACK 9341b5333ad54ccdb7c16802ff06c51b956948e7
hodlinator:
ACK 9341b5333ad54ccdb7c16802ff06c51b956948e7
janb84:
re ACK 9341b5333ad54ccdb7c16802ff06c51b956948e7
Tree-SHA512: cf1d4fff4c15e3f8898ec284929cb83d7e747125d4ee759e77d369f1716728e843ef98030be32c8d608956a96ae2fbefa0e801200c333b9eefd6c086ec032e1f
